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INLucE TuA
In Thy Light
Learning and the Virtues
HE BEGINNING OF THE SCHOOL YEAR BRINGS

T

a familiar chore for teachers, revising
and updating our course syllabi. As Peter
Meilaender notes in his column, "Education for
Bureaucracy;' this routine task has, in recent years,
been getting more burdensome. While syllabi once
were usually fairly concise and straightforward
documents, they are getting much longer as new
requirements keep getting created. Many of these
are easy enough to satisfy. For example, attendance
policies and grading schemes must now be spelled
out, which most teachers already were doing. We
also must notify students of various forms of aid
available to them, such as tutoring or disability assistance. I am skeptical that a syllabus is the best way
to convey this kind of information to those students
who most need it, but there is no harm in including
it, so I copy and paste the recommended language
and don't think much about it.
However, one requirement has proven more
challenging. We now must specify in our syllabi
how specific parts of our courses will help students achieve the Student Learning Objectives,
a university-wide set of goals adopted a few years
ago and referred to (apparently without irony) as
the SLOs. A few of these SLOs cover the kinds of
things that students would do in any course, such
as demonstrating "content knowledge" and learning to "communicate clearly and effectively:' Others,
however, are more ambitious in that they focus on
things like becoming "active learners;' learning to
"interact and collaborate effectively in groups;' and
even cultivating "the virtues of empathy, honesty,
and justice:'
So I am left to ponder, what part of my class
helps students cultivate empathy? Does that happen
during class discussions or pop quizzes? Will read-

ing a particular journal article lead them to practice
justice? Like most professors, I don't much like new
rules that make my job harder, but I cannot deny
that there is value in taking time to consider what
kind oflong-term impact my courses might have on
students. The end of an education is not simply to
learn things; it is to become the kind of person who
lives a life oflearning. And as Mark Schwehn helped
us recognize in Exiles from Eden (1993), scholarship
is not a solitary pursuit. Universities are communities whose members join together in the pursuit of
knowledge and understanding and who also seek to
cultivate virtues that are appropriate and necessary
to the pursuit of knowledge and understanding, virtues like self-discipline, humility, faith, and charity.
This issue of The Cresset explores this relationship between learning and the virtues that
learning both needs and nurtures. In "Knowledge
and Beauty;' Messiah College's Peter Kerry Powers
asks first-year college students to approach their
education as a path not to empowerment but to
humility, an opportunity to become aware of all
they do not know. In "The Imponderability of the
Past;' Thomas Albert Howard of Gordon College
explores how the study of history cultivates the virtue of prudence as we both learn from the past and
recognize the limits of our ability to know it. Harold
K. Bush of St. Louis University reviews James K. A.
Smith's How (Not) to Be Secular (Eerdmans, 2014),
a book that guides readers through the writings of
philosopher Charles Taylor and reflects on how to
live a life of faith in a post -Christian, secular age.
And in "Thinking About Love;' Ian Clausen, a Lilly
Fellow at Valparaiso University, demonstrates how
Christians can engage in philosophical reflection on
the nature oflove.
What happens in a university classroom inevitably has much to do with character formation. This
does not mean that teachers should act like moral
scolds, but that teachers have a responsibility to help
students cultivate certain habits and virtues. In our
classrooms, students are introduced not just to new
ideas, but to new ways of thinking. As important
as learning the subject matter is how they learn to
engage it and how they learn to engage one another,
as members of communities dedicated to the pursuit oflearning. f
-]PO
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Knowledge and Praise
An Open Letter to Christian Students
at the Journey's Beginning
Peter Kerry Powers

I

BEGIN WITH A SIMPLE QUESTION FOR THE

class of 2018, though it is really a question
for all of us: Why higher education? Why
are you now in the place where you find yourselves, whether in the great urban universities
of New York or Chicago, at my home institution of Messiah College, or perhaps Valparaiso
University in Indiana, or in the shadow of
mountains at Bennington in Vermont, where
my son is attending this fall? Until very recently,
a very small percentage of Americans chose to,
or even had the opportunity to, attend a college. Only two or three generations ago, the
large majority of Americans went to work after
high school, or started families, or joined the
military. To these generations, the question
"Why go to college?" was real and urgent, and
people who did so were considered unusual, if
not strange. Now, going to college is for many,
though certainly not all, nearly as common as
owning a cellphone, as natural to our culture as
breathing, such that collectively we hardly stop
to ask after its purposes in any serious way. At
least not until recently. But going to college is
not, after all, breathing, and so it can be worth
stopping to ask yourselves why now, of all the
possibilities you could imagine and conceive,
you find yourselves on a college or university
campus.
Your specific answers are many. Some of
you have moved excitedly into the dorms and
are awaiting classes because you want to get a
better job, some because your parents made
you, some because you are ambitious to learn,
some because you had nothing better to do,
6
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some because your girlfriend or boyfriend came
before you, some because you want to change
the world. Most because of some combination
and calculus of these various possibilities.
I assume, however, that all of you would
say that you are here to get an education. To
what end do we pursue this apparently neverending enterprise? Consider the graduating
class of 2015. By May of this year, they will have
spent at least seventeen years in formal schooling, counting kindergarten. Many will go to
graduate school for two, three, or four years, or
even more, which means that many can count
on spending more than a quarter of their lives
in formal schooling. Counting all my years of
graduate school, I spent twenty-five years under
the formal designation of "student;' a bit less
than half my life to this point. Add to this the
truism that we should be life-long learners and
we can conclude that education is never-ending.
Life is education. To be a human is to be a
student.
Moreover, we pursue this lifelong enterprise
in a tremendous variety of ways. There are many
important ways you are similar to one another,
but there are also important differences of gender and culture, of nationality, and a host of
other particularities. Not least, you are different
in your educational biographies. Many of you
attended large public high schools; others, private Christian schools. Many of you were home
schooled; others have been educated in other
cultures. Few of you will receive your entire college education from the college you now attend.
Some of you are traditional transfer students

from other institutions. Others have received
college credit from dual-enrollment programs,
or have taken summer courses at community
colleges. Many of you will study abroad. Some of
you are beginning your semester at a traditional
four-year college while simultaneously enrolling in an online course at a for-profit university.
All of these institutions agree that education is
essential, but all speak of education with different languages and achieve it in very different
ways. Collectively they underscore rather than
answer my question: What is an education for?
What is your education for?
Like you, I have had a multitude of different
educational experiences. I attended a Christian
college, and attended both a flagship state university and a private research university for
my graduate education. I finished my primary
and secondary schooling in the public schools
of Oklahoma. My education began, however,
in the highlands of Papua New Guinea, where
my father started a hospital and my mother ran
a school for indigenous children in the Wahgi
Valley. I completed part of my early schooling
via correspondence courses, our very low-tech
version of distance learning. Partially home
schooled and living on a mission station that
had electricity only two hours a day, I had a
Lincolnesque beginning in learning to read by
candlelight and by the flickering light of a kero sene lamp set on our kitchen table.
My formal education began in a two-room
schoolhouse located in the village ofBanz, about
four miles from our mission station in Kudjip.
Every morning, a half-dozen missionary kids
loaded into the back of a flatbed truck for the
half-hour trek along a rutted dirt road leading to
school. Arriving at school, in rainy season and
in dry, we stood in ranks by grade, singing "God
Save the Queen" as the Australian flag fluttered
up the flag pole. Our school divided six grades
into two rooms, and initially we had only one
teacher, Mr. Garth, who shuttled frantically to
and fro between the rooms delivering our lessons as best he could. After a year of this we,
and I think especially Mr. Garth, were excited
to welcome a second teacher, Mr. R_ _ , who
came to teach the lower grades.

At that time, like most colonial schools, the
rooms were divided by gender, with boys seated
to the teacher's right and girls seated to the left.
To teach vocabulary, Mr. R_ _ would walk
from one side of the room to the other, having
all the boys stand or all the girls stand and spell
words aloud together. Mr. R_ _ taught these
words in sets of antonyms so that we would

Partially home schooled and
living on a mission station that
had electricity only two hours
a day, I had a Lincolnesque
beginning in learning to read by
candlelight and by the flickering
light of a kerosene lamp set on
our kitchen table.
better perceive their meaning. Good, bad;
black, white; open, closed; and so forth, sometimes pointing to different objects or pictures
in the room to reinforce our lessons. One week
we were taught the words "ugly" and "beautiful;' and "stupid" and "intelligent:' As was his
common practice, Mr. R__ asked all the
girls to stand. Then Mr. R_ _ had all the girls
point at themselves, and required them to spell
aloud together the word "uglY:' He then had
them point together toward him at the front of
the room and spell together the word "beautiful:' Mr. R_ _ then crossed the room and had
all the boys, point together at him and spell out
the word "intelligent." Then, on cue, we pointed
at ourselves and, chanting in unison, we spelled
the word "stupid:'
Mr. R_ _ didn't last long at our school,
and for the most part I have forgotten every
other thing about him.
I should hasten to say that I loved Mr. Garth,
an excellent if too-harried teacher, as so many
are. He was the first to perceive in me some
level of intelligence and the first explicitly to
Michaelmas 2014
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encourage me to take learning seriously. I will
also say, however, that I have never forgotten
how to spell the words "ugly" or "intelligent" or
"beautiful" or "stupid:' We had received, after a
fashion, an education.
Of course, I don't think that what we
received from Mr. R
even constituted
an education in the deepest and most important senses of that word. In his lack of respect
for the humanity of his students, he was in
many respects the antithesis of Mr. Garth, the
antithesis of what teachers are and what they
should attempt to do. Nevertheless, as I have
reflected on him in the decades since, it has
seemed to me that my old teacher had embodied the dark extreme of a common assumption
about education, one so deeply ingrained that we
unthinkingly assume its virtues: that knowledge
primarily concerns a quest for power.

S

0

FAR

AS

WE

KNOW,

THE

APHORISM,

"knowledge is power;' was articulated
first in modern Western history by the
scientist and philosopher Francis Bacon, but
the idea itself is much older. It is also common
in pop culture, stretching from the old School
House Rock jingles to the Star Wars movies. A
Google search conjures images of Superman and
other superheroes that adorn posters designed
for elementary schools, the phrase "Knowledge
is Power" splashed in bold captions beneath
bulging muscles. These superheroes sometimes
carry books as they fly through the air, flexing
their muscles as they go, as if reading builds
slow-twitch fibers.
The idea that knowledge is about selfempowerment is very much a part of the
enterprise of higher education. It is found in the
notion that we primarily get an education to get
a job, pursue a profession, and be financially successful. Knowledge means a job, which means
money, which means power. This is the rhetoric of our politics. Presidents from Eisenhower
to Obama have argued for strengthening education, believing that knowledge is the engine
of our economy, and that a strong economy is
at the root of national power. Republican or
Democrat, liberal or conservative, our political

8
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leaders have all essentially agreed with the sentiment that education will ensure that American
children will continue to lead the world, that the
United States, through education, will remain a
global power.
The connection between knowledge and
power is also found in scholarly traditions
that seem far removed from business or the
American political scene. In Plato's allegory
of the cave, in Enlightenment idealizations
of Reason, and in the many diverse traditions
of the liberal arts and sciences, the pursuit of
truth through philosophy or science is thought
to empower us to free ourselves from mists of
ignorance and falsehood. A good thing, an ideal
to embrace.
Nevertheless, the desire to understand the
world has very often been driven by the desire
to control it. In Toni Morrison's great novel
Beloved, the main character Sethe discovers,
to her consternation and finally to her horror,
that the slave master sees her and her children
as specimens to be studied; the quest to know
about others was continuous with the effort to
enslave them. Plato believed that philosophers
should discover and understand the truth. He
also believed that philosophers should be kings.
A cartoon that I hung on my office door
captures this general sentiment about the purposes of knowledge. A father, in the posture
of elder sage imparting wisdom, tells his son
matter-of-factly: "Knowledge is power. ... The
power to make other people feel stupid." A lesson, I think, that my old teacher in New Guinea
had learned well. I hung this cartoon on my
door to remind myself of the temptations of
false knowledge. The temptation of false knowledge-whether you are pursuing your education
to become a CEO or to understand the mindbending complexities of theoretical physics-is
to imagine others as lesser than yourself. The
Greek philosopher Aristotle is said to have
asserted, "Educated men are as much superior
to uneducated men as the living are to the dead:'
One does not get much more superior in one's
own mind than that.
To recognize this temptation is not to reject
the fact that education is empowering; nor is it

to suggest, if you are attending college in part
because you want a better job or because you
want to "improve" yourself, that you've come
for the wrong reasons. If it is possible for us to
seek knowledge in order to enrich ourselves at
the expense of others, it hardly follows that poverty and dependency are ideals. It is still a good
thing, as the adage goes, to teach a man to fish.
Nor, frankly, should the fact that false knowledge can be falsely used be seen as an excuse
to wallow in ignorance. Sloth of the mind is no
more of a virtue than that of the body.
And so, my claim here is not against knowledge rightly understood. My claim is that the
desire for a better job or a more secure life, or
the desire for a more sophisticated understanding of the world, all these represent only partial
virtues. They are good things that can become
bad things, true things that become false things,
if they are not grounded in a larger and more
generous vision. In this view, an understanding
of knowledge that is primarily about selfempowerment and self-aggrandizement falls
short of a properly Christian view of education
and its purposes.
That view of education assumes that learning empowers us, first and foremost, to love.
The goal of our education, both in this place
and in the schoolhouse of our lives, is to deepen,
broaden, and strengthen our capacity to love
both God and our neighbors, and as a consequence of that love, to offer praise to God who
is in, through, and above all things, who is the
Author of all Knowledge.
At first blush, direct linking of the pursuit
of knowledge and the capacity for love is counterintuitive for many Christians; indeed, some
view learning and love as if they are antithetical.
American Christians especially have been notoriously anti-intellectual because, as we know,
knowledge puffs up but love builds up.
Contrary to the notion that the noxious
flowering of knowledge is pride, I believe that
all genuine knowledge begins in humility. A
story: At the age of eighteen I was on the verge
of setting off for Wheaton College. Having
grown up in a strongly sectarian household, I
was the first child in my entire extended family

to attend a college other than one sponsored
by ou~ denomination; this fact was the subject
of family discussions and perhaps a few family
prayer meetings. In our view, Wheaton was a
"so-called Christian college;' one my family felt
sure was bursting with liberal ideas, or at least
ideas that were not our ideas. At a party in my
honor shortly before leaving home, I was sitting
in a chair receiving gifts and congratulations
when an older cousin came up and knelt down

The ability to learn, like the
ability to love, depends first on
a conviction that we are not
sufficient, that we are not complete,
and that we don't yet know what or
as we really ought to know.
next to me. Taking my hand in hers and eyeing
me carefully, she said, "Now, Peter, I want you
to go up there and give those people the Truth:'
This impressed me terribly. My cousin's
admonition fit pretty well with my own sense
that at eighteen I knew just about everything I
needed to know. College would be a formality.
In those days, when I looked at Pete Powers in
the mirror, I pretty much liked what I saw. It was
as if I looked in a mirror and saw the universe.
But narcissism is the opposite of knowledge, not its culmination. The ability to learn,
like the ability to love, depends first on a conviction that we are not sufficient, that we are not
complete, and that we don't yet know what or as
we really ought to know. A proper understanding of both ourselves and the world around us
requires that we lay ourselves open, vulnerable
to change as we encounter the world of God's
making and God's care that is far greater than the
furthest reach of our imagination. This means
that the pursuit of knowledge, whether in college or in life, is rightly understood as a spiritual
discipline. If we let it, the pursuit of knowledge
nurtures the virtue of humility, allowing us
Michaelmas 2014
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to see ourselves more truly and others more
generously.
Mark Schwehn, a Professor of Humanities
and formerly provost at Valparaiso University,
says the following about learning and humility:

and open doors to rooms with yet more doors.
And choose and open. And choose and open.
And on and on.
We grow in the knowledge of many things.
And for all knowledge we can be thankful. But
the fundamental lesson of my parable is this: we
Humility... does not mean uncritigrow primarily in our awareness of how many
cal acceptance: it means, in practical
doors we did not open, how many doors we
terms, the presumption of wisdom and
will never open, and how many things we will
authority in [others].
never understand. This is
Students and faculty ...
the great irony of the life
are far too often ready
of the mind: knowing as
to believe that Kant
we ought to know leads us
was just. .. murky or
into an ever-deeper awarethat Aristotle was
ness that we know so very
pointlessly repetitive,
little.
or that Tolstoy was ...
This suggests that the
needlessly
verbose.
pursuit of knowledge,
Such quick, easy, and
rightly understood, is a
journey not into power
dismissive appraisals
and control, but into ever
preclude the possibility
deepening awareness of
of learning from these
writers .. . Some degree
mystery. Therefore, its ultimate destination is God.
of humility is a precondition for learning.
The sculptor C. Malcolm
(Exiles from Eden, 49)
Powers captures this attitude in his bronze entitled
"Intellectual Praise:' A
Contrary to our received
scholar stands in a poscultural images of vain
ture of praise, with arms
and violent intellectuals
from Faust to Hawthorne's
lifted toward a heavenly
vision. His or her arms,
Rappaccini to Hannibal
C. Malcolm Powers.
Intellectual Praise, c2004.
and even part of the torso,
Lecter, such humility is a
Lost-wax casting in bronze. H. 9" x W. 0.5'' x D. 3.5".
are rendered as books
virtue that the life of the
Location: Artist's show room, Ann Arbor, Michigan .
mind does not diminish,
that the scholar is raising
up to God in rapture. The
but nourishes.
scholar's bookish arms echo the appearance of
Learning, rightly understood, is like enteran angel's wings, as if the scholar's knowledge
ing a great mansion with many rooms. In each
has become part and parcel of who the scholar
room we enter there are many doors. We choose
is and part of what compels and lifts her toward
doors to open by whatever light and desire is
a heavenly vision. One book lies at the scholar's
given to us. Sometimes we choose by happenfeet, perhaps an acknowledgement that we canstance and sometimes because we have nothing
not possess all knowledge, or, as I prefer to think
better to do, or perhaps because it was a door our
father or mother opened, or perhaps because
of it, as an image of the scholar casting the crown
of her knowledge toward the feet of Christ on
your Facebook friends liked a digital page, or
the last day. However, the scholar's gaze is not
perhaps because one door is first at hand and
directed toward that missing book or even, in
others a little further off. Each door opens to a
the classic rendering of scholarly activity, toward
room with many other doors. And so we choose

10
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the books she has in hand, absorbed and away
from the world around her; the scholar's vision
is trained on God, brought to and loving God
through knowledge, and offering that knowledge
back to God as the true author of the knowledge
we have gained.
In Dante's Paradiso, as Dante comes to
the conclusion of his pilgrimage through hell
and purgatory and into heaven, he describes
his divine vision of the glory of Christ on his
throne, saying:
And so my mind was totally entranced
In gazing deeply, motionless, intent;
The more it saw the more it burned to see.
(Canto XXXIII)
This passage suggests that humility is not only
the precondition of knowledge; it is also the
substance and end of knowledge that leads to
praise. The more he saw-of Christ, of the world
made through Christ, the world sustained in
Christ, the world of men and women made in
the image of Christ and loved by Christ in all
their abounding variety-the more he saw, the
more he burned to see.
As you begin or continue your studies
of literature and art, of history and music, of
theology and biology and physics and sociology
and psychology, of business and nursing and

all the rest, as you open one or two or three of
the infinity of doors that lie before you, it is my
prayer that the more you see, the more you will
burn to see. If that is the education that yo u
pursue, I believe that yo u will find yo urselves
compelled to join together with the Apostle
Paul, singing the great hymn from scripture
(Romans 11:33-36):
0 the depth of the riches and wisdom
and knowledge of God! How
unsearchable are his judgments and
how inscrutable his ways!
For who has known the mind of the
Lord? Or who has been his
counselor?
Who has given a gift to him,
to receive a gift in return?
For from him and through him and to
him are all things. To him be the
glory, for ever and ever. Amen. f

Peter Kerry Powers is the Dean of the
School of Humanities of Messiah College.
This essay is based on remarks presented
to the Messiah College Convocation of
August 2010.
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The Imponderability of the Past

Thomas Albert Howard

I

N

THE

LATE

9005,

THE

BYZANTINE

Emperor Basil ("the Bulgar Slayer") led
an army from Constantinople against the
Bulgars who had invaded his territories in
Greece. Defeated at first, he raised new armies
and kept returning to the fray. The turning
point finally came in 1014 when his imperial
troops managed to capture fifteen thousand
Bulgar warriors. Instead of killing his captives,
he decided to blind them, except for one in
every one hundred, whom he left with one eye
each so that they could lead their comrades
back home.
One hundred and fifty eyes short of the
blind leading the blind, the image of the
mutilated Bulgars marching home, defeated,
possesses an arresting, suggestive power.
Those of us who attempt to know the past and
claim that knowledge of it affords some guidance to the present might well identify with
the one-eyed Bulgars: we see in part and we
have a capacity to lead; but we recognize our
defeats and limitations, the stubborn lacunae
of what we cannot see and do not know.
This awareness was driven home to me
recently on a study trip abroad, in which I led
several former students to Italy, to the cities
of Orvieto, Florence, and Rome. Afterward,
I continued traveling on my own to Istanbul,
Turkey, the erstwhile "Nuova Roma" or
Constantinople (330) until its sack by the
Ottoman Turks in 1453, a red-letter date in
world history. It was this latter, personal leg
of the journey that prompted me to read up
on the history of Istanbul, during which I
12
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encountered the curious story of Basil and the
eyeless Bulgars.
But for the theme of this essay-the imponderability of the past-the first part of the trip
with the students and the solo one afterward
must be understood together. For the study trip
to Italy, we had selected as our topic: "Virtue
and Vice: Explorations in History, Ethics, and
Art, and Place;' a capacious set of foci, I admit.
Our joint readings included Dante's Purgatorio
and some short works by the twentieth -century
Thomist philosopher Josef Pieper, notably one
of his classics, The Four Cardinal Virtues. In it,
Pieper discusses the cardinal or classical virtues
of Prudence, Justice, Courage, and Temperance,
which first appear in Plato's Republic. They
were later baptized into Christian thought,
most influentially in Thomas Aquinas's Summa
Theologiae, and subordinated to the New
Testament theological virtues of Faith, Hope,
and Love.
During our trip, we paired our readings
with actual sightings of the virtues, frequently
rendered as female allegorical figures in medieval and Renaissance art. They appear on the
walls and ceilings of the Vatican museums, for
example; in several places in fact, but most dramatically in Raphael's stanza della segnatura, in
the same room as his famous School of Athens.
We discovered them often in Florence: on the
doors of the Duomo's Baptistery, on the side of
the Duomo's bell tower, at the Franciscan church
of Santa Croce, in the Uffizi museum, and above
the head of Thomas Aquinas in a provocative
fresco, "The Triumph of Saint Thomas;' painted

by Andrea di Bonaiuto da Firenze in the chapter
room of the Santa Maria Novella, once the leading Dominican monastery in Florence.
The iconography of the virtues fa scinates. For the novice, Justice is the easiest to
recognize among the cardinal virtues. She is
usually associated with temporal power and
fair treatment and portrayed (sometimes blindfolded) holding a sword and measuring scales.
Fortitude or Courage, often depicted with a
lion, usually wears armor and holds a mace or
another weapon; she is prepared to die honorably for the good. By contrast, we found
Temperance portrayed with a
sheathed sword (the
sheath symbolizing
the limits of wrath),
pouring a moderate amount of wine
(a caution against
drunkenness),
or
with a horse's rein,
suggesting the restraint necessary for the
moral life.
But the figure
that I found most

with three eyes in her head (one fixed on the
past, one the present, and one the future). In
this guise she appears in Canto XXIX of the
Purgatorio. Here, when Dante has almost completed his sanctification and is ready to sojourn
heavenwardly with Beatrice, he encounters first
the theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Love,
and then the cardinal virtues, led by Prudence:
Upon the left hand four made festive
Vested in purple, following the measure
Of one of them with three eyes in
her head (tre occhi in testa).
(Dante, 651)
Perhaps if the Bulgars
were better led against
the Turks in 1014 by
the "three-eyed one;'
as Prudence is called
in some translations
of Dante, they would
have retained their
own eyes. But this only
invites the question
of exactly what prudence, understood as

captivating
was
Prudence, from Raphael's The Cardinal
a three-eyed virtue,
that of Prudence
and Theological Virtues, 1511 .
is supposed to mean,
(prudentius), the
Mural in The Palazzi Vaticani, Vatican City.
and what is its reivirtue that is least understood today. It is also the
evance to historical understanding?
virtue most relevant to thinking well about hisThe first thing that should be said, however,
torical knowledge and its limits. Artists depict
is that prudence, in medieval and Renaissance
her in several ways. In Raphael's stanze, seated
moral philosophy, was not regarded as a "standbetween Temperance and Courage, she holds a
alone" virtue. 1 It constituted one virtue in the
mirror to herself, suggesting that the prudent
seven-fold scheme of the cardinal and theaperson must possess accurate self-knowledge:
logical virtues, as I have already suggested.
know thyself. Often she holds a snake, an
Josef Pieper nicely sums up the general moral
oblique reference to the Gospel of Matthew
template:
(1 0: 16) where Christ admonished his disciples
"to be as wise as serpents and as innocent as
First: the Christian is one who, in faith,
doves." On the Baptistery doors in Florence, she
becomes aware of the reality of the triis portrayed with a Janus face, one face looking
une God. Second: the Christian strives,
forward, the other backward, suggesting that
in hope, for the total fulfillment of his
the wise person prepares for the future through
being in eternal life. Third: the Christian
memory and knowledge of the past.
directs himself, in the divine virtue
Dante employs a similar iconographic
of love, to an affirmation of God and
image in his Divine Comedy, portraying her
neighbor that surpasses the power of
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any natural love. Fourth: the Christian
is prudent; namely he does not allow
his view on reality to be controlled by...
his will, but rather he makes ... [his] will
dependent upon the truth of real things.
Fifth: the Christian is just; that is, he is
able to live "with the other" in truth ...
Sixth, the Christian is brave, that is, he
is prepared to suffer injury and, if need
be, death for the truth ... Seventh: the
Christian is temperate; namely he does
not permit his ... desire for pleasure to
become destructive and inimical to his
being. (1988, 20-21)
While in the Christian scheme of things, love
(caritas, Agape) commands the place of highest
honor, the virtue most exemplifying imitatio
Christi, prudence possesses an indispensability all of its own. Thomas Aquinas insisted, for
example, that all virtues, theological and cardinal, owed a special debt to prudence, because
moral rectitude always depends on accurately
sizing up reality, knowing the truth. Thomas
even wrote, Omnis virtus moralis debet esse
prudens (all virtue is necessarily prudent). 2 The
achievement of good action always entails an
unconfused, sobered-minded view of reality, an
honest, probing "taking stock" of how the world
and human nature are.
Understood in this sense, prudence is a matter of Being, of what philosophers call ontology:
a predicating of right understanding and good
action on how being is, how human reality is in
fact constituted. In his discussion of prudence,
Pieper puts it this way:
All duty is based upon being (Sein).
Reality is the basis of ethics. Goodness
is the standard of reality. Whoever wants
to know and do the good must direct
his gaze toward the objective world of
being, not toward his own sentiment or
toward arbitrarily established "ideals"
and "models:' He must look away from
his own deed and look upon reality. The
"soundness" of justice, of fortitude, of
temperance, of fear of the Lord and of
14
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virtue in general is in the fact that they
are appropriate to objective reality, both
natural and supernatural. Conformity
to reality is the principle of both
[intellectual] soundness and [ethical]
goodness. The precedence of prudence
indicates that the realization of goodness presumes knowledge of reality.
(1988, 20-21)
Knowing things as they really are constitutes the
soul of prudence. But prudence is not meant to
be a matter of knowledge alone, but a knowledge
that disposes one toward right action. It is not
a "theoretical virtue;' in other words, but one
that operates to help the moral actor comport
herself well and thereby contribute to human
flourishing. In the words of Pieper again:
Prudence... [seeks to] transform ...
knowledge of reality into the accomplishment of the good. It encompasses
the humility of silence, i.e., unbiased
understanding,
memory's faithfulness to being, the art of letting things
speak for themselves, the alert composure before the unexpected. Prudence
means hesitant seriousness ... , the filter
of reflection, and yet also the daring
courage for definitive resolution. (1988,
20-21)
For anyone trained in history, parts of this
definition suggest a prescription for sound
historical inquiry. "The humility of silence":
listening attentively to the past for every
nuance and shade of meaning. "Unbiased
understanding": trying insofar as humanly possible not to let one's own commitments and
prejudices contaminate insight. "Memory's
faithfulness to being": validating the importance of individual and collective memory in
our constructions of the past. "The art of letting
things speak for themselves": bringing to life
actual historical voices. And "alert composure
before the unexpected": readiness to alter or
abandon one's understanding of the past in light
of new knowledge or countervailing evidence.

But, once again, prudence is never divorced from
action; it is meant to help one achieve a "definitive resolution;' to pursue the good actively. The
three-eyed allegorical image bolsters this point:
prudence scours memory and the past to assist
an individual or a collective in the present, so
that they might pursue a right and just course
for the future.

A

ND YET-AND YET. THE QUESTION ARISES,

given the distorting power of self-interest
and the limitations of our knowledge,
can one ever know enough, or know in the right
manner, to make a wholly prudent decision? Is
the fabric of human understanding more akin to
the one-eyed Bulgars leading their blinded comrades home than the ebullient, dancing three-eyed
lady in Dante's Commedia? As Cicero observed
in his On Duties, are not many circumstances in
which we find ourselves "perplexingly difficult
to assess" (Cicero, 165)? Or, to refer back to my
title, are not many historical moments simply
imponderable? The word imponderable and its
kin "to ponder;' revealingly, are derived from the
Middle English word, meaning to weigh (pondren), which we still have in the word "pound:'
In this etymological light, are many constellations
of historical events simply unweighable, impossible to make sense of fully, elusive in pointing
moral actors in the present to a prudent course of
action? Put in the language of the virtues themselves, how ought one prudently reckon with the
limits of prudence, given that these limits are in
fact very much a component of the complicated,
lived human reality that prudence asks us to
understand?
Such questions tugged at my mind during
my time abroad: in Italy, but even more pressingly in "New Rome;' today's Istanbul. I had
some knowledge of the Byzantine and Ottoman
empires, to be sure, and of the secularizing
reforms of Kemal Atatiirk in the 1920s that
established modern-day Turkey. But encountering, first-hand, the intoxicating complexity
and otherness of Istanbul's past, while inciting
curiosity, left me, finally, with an unsettling
feeling of disquiet. This disquiet crept over me
while standing with Muslims at the tomb of

Mehmet II (The Conquerer), the sultan who
had sacked Constantinople in 1453. I sensed
it again at the Mosque dedicated to Eyup
Ensari, one of the companions of the Prophet
Mohammed who had died in an attempted
siege of Constantinople in the 670s. I felt it at
the Hagia Sophia, once the grandest church in
Christendom; at Topaki Palace, the home of
the sultans until the eighteenth-century; at the
Galata Bridge that crosses the Golden Horn
into Boyoglu, the hip, Westernized part of the
city. And I certainly felt it upon entering the

Encountering, first-hand, the
intoxicating complexity and
otherness of Istanbul's past,
while inciting curiosity, left
me, finally, with an unsettling
feeling of disquiet.

city's many Ottoman-era cemeteries, ubiquitous
reminders of countless bygone lives, unknown
and unknowable to most passersby.
I suppose it was, finally, this unsettling feeling of bygoneness, of immense
irretrievability, that permeates the city and
which I found arresting, worthy of reflection.
The Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk connects this
feeling with the Turkish notion of melancholy
(huzun) in his memoir, Istanbul: "No matter how
ill-kept, no matter how neglected or hemmed in
they are by [more recent] concrete monstrosities, the great mosques and other monuments of
the city, as well as the lesser detritus of empire
in every side street and corner-the little arches,
fountains, and neighborhood mosques-inflict
heartache on all who live among them" (101).
Defeat is present too, at least for the historically
attuned. For not only did the city nourish two of
the world's mightiest empires-the Byzantine and
the Ottoman-but it also witnessed their demises,
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the Byzantine spectacularly in 1453, the Ottoman
ignominiously as a consequence of World War I.
"Defeat goes deeper into the human soul than victory;' writes the Arab historian Albert Hourani;
"to be in someone else's power is a conscious
experience which induces doubts about the order
of the universe, while those who have power can
forget it, or can assume that it is part of the natural order of things or adopt ideas which justify
their possession of it" (300) . Like few other cities, Istanbul has known the surge of power and its
evacuation.

T

O BE SURE, THE HISTORIAN HAS MANY

tools in her kit to reconstruct the past,
to separate the important from the insignificant, to draw trenchant parallels between
present and past. These tools should be used
vigorously and with a high sense of purpose; the
achievements of modern historiography, with
its quest for firm evidence and objectivity, are
galloping victories of the human spirit.
But one must, finally, recognize their limits:
a thick cloud of unknowing always accompanies the retrospective gaze. This reality places
stark bounds on the acquisition of prudence. In
his Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas recognizes this. He divides prudence into three parts:
1) deliberation, the art of thinking well and
bringing the relevant bits of particular knowledge, historical or otherwise, to the table; 2)
judging well, making appropriate sense of deliberation, with an eye toward; 3) right action,
deciding accurately and behaving well with a view
to achieving the good. Among the many deterrents to prudence, Thomas lists ignorance and
forgetfulness, the inaccessibility of the relevant past to the moral agent. Moreover, he
also speaks of the "infinite variety" of particular facts that no human being or collective can
possibly master and reflect well about "in a
short span of time:' In pedestrian terms, prudence then is an art, not a science, a matter of
probability, not certainty, a virtue of the mind
suspended between the rich possibilities and
stark limitations found in the "various and uncertain" aspects of human knowledge, historical or
otherwise (Aquinas, 12-14).
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The nature of these limitations were exquisitely probed in an essay from the nineteenth
century entitled, straightforwardly enough,
"On the Limitations of Historical Knowledge"
by the now-forgotten Swiss scholar Wilhelm
Vischer, a colleague of Friedrich Nietzsche at
the University of Basel. Originally delivered as
an academic address, Vischer attributed great
importance to the rise of modern historiography in the context of the German university
system, then the envy of the world. But, as the
title suggests, he sought to remind his fellow
historians of the "fixed and unalterable" limitations placed on knowing the past. Historical
knowledge "can never be total;' he proclaimed;
"it will necessarily contain gaps, and in order to
fill these gaps ... we shall be obliged to resort to
a connecting activity of our understanding or to
the observations of others, most frequently both
at once." Daily lived experience, he continued,
points out the elusiveness of ascertaining what
actually happened: "much that we remember
slips out of sequence and becomes unmoored
from its original relations, and the unceasing
activity of the understanding and imagination
will create ever new images out of the remains
of our observations, imperfectly retained as
they will have been in our memory, and none
of these will be exactly identical with the image
we had just a moment earlier. Such is the uncertainty even of that source which comes to us
from our [own] observations and experiences"
(Gossman, 41).
Plumbing the experience of people remote
in time from ours is thus all the harder. "The
uncertainty is increased in proportion as the
observations we have to work with are less
immediate ... Two accounts of the same [past]
event, even by the most reliable witnesses, will
never completely coincide, they will always differ from each other, at one point or another,
more or less considerably, and not necessarily
only in the inessentials. But quite often the witness is actually unreliable. And the very question
whether he is or not, which is the first question
we must answer, can be an exceedingly difficult
one that will be resolved by one historian in one
way and by another historian in another." And

when it comes finally to writing and publishing history, Vischer sighs, "how many are the
distortions ... produced by ignorance and lack of
understanding, preconceived ideas, or the partisan intentions of editors" (Gossman, 42) .
Goading those positivists in the nineteenth
century who wanted to turn history into an
"exact science;' Vischer avers that our knowledge of the past will always be "distorting"
and "fragmentary." "In the realm of historical
knowledge no absolute certainty can ever be
attained, that all we can ever reach is probability, and that even facts which we are accustomed
to accept as absolutely certain and reliable rest
only on the testimony of human beings who
are intellectually and morally imperfect and
subject to error." In fact, history is sufficiently
distant from science, he concludes, that we
might do better to consider it akin to poetry:
"History cannot immediately reproduce facts in
their naked reality or integrality. It can evoke
the image which impressed itself on the mind
of the participant or the observer and to which
he gave expression-not directly, but through
a process of conscious or unconscious poetic
creation, through art. Thus every historical
narrative-even those that are relatively most
reliably and most immediate-falls into the category of poetry" (Gossman, 49).
Perhaps Vischer overplays his hand here,
for there are good reasons to regard history and
poetry as distinct enterprises. But by expressing
the quandary of the historical knower in this
manner, Vischer fortuitously points us toward
some ancient reflections offered by Aristotle. In
his Poetics, Aristotle opined that "the difference
between a poet and a historian is this: the historian relates what has happened, the poet what
could happen. Therefore, poetry is something
more philosophic and of more serious import
than history; for poetry tends to deal with the
general, while history is concerned with delimited particular facts" (Aristotle, 18) .
These sentences have furrowed the brows of
historians for centuries. But risking the charge
of heresy from my guild, I think Aristotle is on
to something. Often the pursuit of "delimited
particular facts;' as Aristotle calls them, takes

on an exaggerated life of its own, to the exclusion of more general, properly basic human
modes of inquiry that we might associate with
poetry and philosophy. And I am not talking
about the academic "fields" of "creative writing"
or "analytic philosophy;' but something at once
more common and marvelous. If I may return
to Josef Pieper, I refer to what Pieper, quoting
the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus, called,
"listening to the essence of things;' allowing
Being, in its manifold complexity and as phenomenologically immediate to the individual
person, to impress itself passively on consciousness. The "capacity of simplex intuitus:' simply
intuiting or understanding, observes Pieper,
is one of the most irreducibly human acts.
Distinguishing between the medieval ter!lls
ratio and intellectus, Pieper associates the
poetic and the philosophical, with the latter,
not the former. The former, ratio, is "the power
of discursive, logical thought, of searching and
examination, of abstraction, of definition and
drawing conclusions." Sound historical inquiry
would proceed along these lines, and rightly
it should. But if unwarrantedly absolutized, it
would deflect the understanding from intellectus, a more passive, receptive, and I would add,
elusive, form of understanding in which Being
"offers itself like a landscape to the eye" (Pieper
1952, 9).
Historical scholarship requires ratio; contemplating the past as an aspect of Being-and
contemplating oneself contemplating it -suggests
intellectus: taking in, beholding, ruminating,
pondering.

I

N

OUR

(POST)MODERN

TIMES,

IT

IS

difficult to make fumbling references to
"Being;' as I am guilty of doing, without
reference to the ponderous legacy of the philosopher Martin Heidegger. Let me make
that reference explicit, then, by drawing from
Heidegger himself and one of his intellectual
heroes (and mine), Blaise Pascal. Together,
they help us think well about the limitations
of historical knowing and its bearing on
consciousness, what I take to be an implicit
element in Heidegger's 1927 opus Sein und
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Zeit (Being and Time) and in Pascal's wonder
and dread at the "eternal silences" of time and
space that encompass and impinge upon the
searching mind.
Admittedly, it is often not time, but nature,
especially the sublime in nature written of
with such rhapsodic eloquence by Edmund
Burke and Immanuel Kant, that triggers the big
philosophical questions, the keep-you-awakeat-night unfathomables about the immensity,
terror, and beauty of it "all." This is especially .
true perhaps of one of the grandest questions
ever posed: Leibniz's "why is there something
rather than nothing?" But as Heiddegger recognized, it can just as readily be time, Zeit, that
can induce the untethered, sleepless moments.
Why am I here, seemingly thrown (geworfen)
here, in this particular place and time, instead
of another place and time, instead of no-place
and no-time? It is this reality, the strange dialectic between what the scholastic philosophers
called the "quiddity" (the this-ness) of the timespace-bound self and the zero-sum alternative
of non-existence, that lies, I think, at the heart
of Heidegger's Seinsfrage, his question about
Being, his rapturous, circuitous, often impenetrable interrogation of what (and why?) it is
to be and the relationship between individuals beings and that agonized-after Northwest
Passage of Heidegger's mind: Being (Sein).
George Steiner, one of the more incisive
commentators on Heidegger, has nicely summarized Heidegger's pursuit. "For the greatest
majority of human beings;' he writes, such questioning of the very foundations of Being looms
"in moments of great despair, when things tend
to lose all their weight and all meaning becomes
obscured." "Or it can be experienced in flashes
of vital brilliance, when sensory discrimination pierces the skin of things [the sublime?]
But in most cases the question 'will strike like a
muffled bell that rings into our life and gradually dies away.' For Heidegger, however, it is the
one and only interrogation, the incessant asking without which there can be neither a proper
humanity, nor a coherent mode of individual or
social existence, nor any philosophy worthy of
its name" (Steiner, 35).
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The historian is properly preoccupied with
"particular delimited facts," as Aristotle noted,
and with them valuable assistance is offered in
general understanding and in the acquisition
of prudence. But as a human being, the historian, like few fellow inquirers, sits astride and
busies herself with time, Zeit-the vast, multisubjective chain and conglomerate of human
experience-some recoverable, but most
unfathomable, buried in a perpetually receding,
inaccessible sludge of anonymity. If the historian aspires to be a human being and not merely
a historian, she should sometimes-perhaps
often-lift her spade from the particular and
delimited (acquired through ratio) to the general and expansive (a matter of intellectus), from
"the times" to the mystery of time, and from
then-as Heidegger would have it-on to being:
from Zeit to Sein. Reflecting on the limits of
our knowledge, the imponderability of the past,
suggests itself as a good place to begin.
Heidegger sometimes kept a picture
of Pascal on his wall. For the Christian and
religiously-inclined mind, Pascal's stance toward
Being might hold yet more resonance. For Pascal
connects the question of Being to the question
of God in a way that Heidegger felt impossible, or at least terminally inconclusive, after
the so-called "Death of God" in the twentieth
century. But what for Heidegger was inconclusive, we might retain as possible-difficult, to
be sure, under the cultural conditions of late
modernity-but glimpsible under the guideposts of those higher virtues: faith, hope, and
love. Writing after the Copernican revolution in
astronomy, Pascal was among the first to muse
on the infinitesimally small place of human
beings in the cosmos and the challenges this
posed for religious assent. We find ourselves, he
wrote, "lost in this corner of the universe"; "the
whole visible world is only an imperceptible dot
in nature's amble bosom. No idea comes near it;
it is no good inflating our conceptions beyond
imaginable space, we only bring forth atoms
compared to the reality of things." And as he
most famously observed: "The eternal silence
of these infinite spaces fills me with dread"
(Pascal, 59, 66).

The dialectic of rapture and terror that
shouted at Pascal from nature also whispered to
him from his experience of time. He was captivated by how historical contingencies produced
events that led to other events and, in turn, to
other events, and so. If Cleopatra's nose had
been smaller, he famously mused, the history
of the world might have turned out differently,
for Julius Caesar and Mark Antony might not
have fallen in love with her. "Cleopatra's nose"
became for him a shorthand expression to
convey the phenomenological experience of
time as a fast-moving accretion of seemingly
fathomless contingencies.
Sometimes Pascal's reflections on time merge
with self-reflection on the brevity of life. "When
I consider the brief span of my life absorbed
into the eternity which comes before and afteras the remembrance of a guest that tarrieth but
a day3-the small space I occupy and which I
see swallowed up in the infinite immensity... , of
which I know nothing and which knows nothing
of me, I take fright and am amazed to see myself
here rather than there: there is no reason for me
to be here rather than there, now rather than then.
Who put me here? By whose command and act
were this time and place allotted to me" (19)? In
the course of a life, Pascal felt that human beings
were at once "incapable of certain knowledge or
[of] absolute ignorance." We long to know, to
gain wisdom and comprehension. But "nothing
stands still for us;' he continued; "We burn with
desire to find a firm footing, an ultimate, lasting
base on which to build a tower rising to infinity,
but our whole foundation cracks and the earth
opens up in the depth of the abyss" (63). The
yawning gulf of time envelops us; we strain to
see, but our vision often blurs.

A

MELANCHOLY PATHOS SHROUDS A LONE

traveler in a large metropolis, especially
one of great historical significance. I
could not shake this feeling while in Istanbul.
On my last night in the city, I walked out on the
Galata Bridge across the Golden Horn, which
separates the Sultanamet district of the city
(once the home of the sultans) from Boyoglu
(where Genoese and Venetian merchants once

set up shop). Few spots rival this one as a place
to size up some of the deeper currents of world
history. One can see the Hagia Sophia in all its
resplendent night-time glory, the church of one
empire, the mosque of another, before becoming
in the 1930s a museum, perhaps the most telling
institution of modernity. From the bridge, one
can glance out over the Bosophorus, the narrow
passage of water that separates Europe from
Asia; who controlled this passage controlled
the destiny of millions. One can look up the
Golden Horn toward the Fatih district, where
the Patriarch of Constantinople, the worldwide
leader of Orthodox Christians, resides, now
behind guarded walls and the thick presence of
Turkish police. One can look southwest from
the bridge and see the Suleymaniye, the massive
mosque built by Suleiman the Magnificent, the
most powerful sultan of the Ottoman Empire
and one of the most dominant rulers in world
history. Had his forces sacked Vienna in 1529,
how would we read history today? We arrive
back at Cleopatra's nose.
Beneath the sprawl of modern Istanbul and
beneath the Ottoman legacy lies, of course, the
memory of the Byzantine Empire, which ceased
to exist on May 29, 1453. You can tell the perspective of the person you are talking to, Or han
Pamuk once observed, if they refer to this event
as the Fall of Constantinople or the Conquest
of Istanbul. Different narratives of this event
and centuries-old accumulations of rival interpretations lend credence to either phrase. And
if one digs back a little further, you will arrive,
as I did, at the story of the Byzantine Emperor
Basil, "the Bulgar Slayer;' and the ghoulish train
of maimed Bulgars that he vanquished.
For reasons not entirely clear to me, this image
became to me a placeholder for the immensity and
irretrievability of the past and for our limitations
in encountering it. The study of history is a magnificent thing and there is much we can and ought
to know. More precisely, penetrating knowledge of
the past helps in the acquisition of prudence, that
searching knowledge oriented toward foresight
and virtuous action. At the same time, it would be
arrogant-and therefore imprudent-to believe
that the past can be "mastered;' definitively
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pinned down, encountered only in the spirit of
ratio, discursive and analytic reasoning. The past
also ought to awaken in us intellectus, a passive,
more ruminative, poetic disposition of mind
that enlarges the imagination in the very act of
humbling it. Through intellectus, the manifold
artifacts, beauty, and inscrutability of the past
enable us to better "know thyself" by allowing us
to see ourselves, in words of the poet Billy Collins,
"stand[ing] in the tremble of thought I taking the
vast outside into ourselves:' Or, in biblical language, it nudges us toward that "firm footing"
that Pascal ardently desired, but only insofar as it
helps us recognize that we know only in part, that
we see in a glass darkly. 't

This essay is dedicated to Mark Schwehn, dear
friend and mentor.
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Endnotes
1. The following few paragraphs draw from material
that I treated in Thomas Albert Howa rd, "Virtue
Ethics and Historical Inquiry: The Case of Prudence;' in John Fea, Jay Green , and Eric Miller, eds.,
Confessing History: Explorations in Christian Faith
and the Historian's Vo cation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010).
2. On the importance of prudence in the thought of
Thomas Aquinas, see Nelson 1992.
3. This is reference to the Book of Wisdom, verse 15.

BEETLE CHILD

[1

All summer, my poet friend was busy
tending a beetle her husband picked for her
instead of a cocktail dress.
They named it after their favorite
sumo wrestler.
She and I share the same body type,
dry skin and melancholy frame of mind,
and we both remain childless.
Beetles are not meant to survive
autumn, even those fat, shiny ones
from fancy department stores in Tokyo.
They die like hollow chestnuts
whether or not they receive food,
water, and quality affection verging on
desperation-she even fed her beetle
with the sherbert flesh of an out-of-season
melon that comes in a wooden box,
a premium gift for the sick.
Now, fallen leaves surround their house.
As she rakes in silence,
I fold a tiger out of golden origami,
complaining about my drafty bed
and frostbitten toes. Just like this,
words are dry enough to burn, and fire is for
sharing. We are at the end of the season,
trying to close the door
that isn't there.

I
i

Miho Nonaka
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Reading Wendell Berry at Costco
How (Not) to Be Secular

by James K. A. Smith
Harold K. Bush

I

N HIS VOLUME IMAGINING

THE

KiNGDOM,

part two of a promised trilogy on the experience and phenomenology of worship and
formation in contemporary America, James K. A.
Smith describes an unsettling experience. One
day, he finds himself in the loud and busy food
court of a typical Costco near his home. There he
sits, innocently reading a book in the food court.
But upon further reflection, this act of reading
turns out to be a deeply unsettling and disturbing
moment, because it is a book by Wendell Berry,
environmentalist extraordinaire, being consumed
in the belly of the beast: a place that Smith decides
might represent, for Berry, "the sixth circle of hell"
(8). Smith's self-reflection on his own cognitive
dissonance between what he thinks he believes
and what he in action believes and actually lives,
illustrates precisely why I delight in studying the
prodigious works of one of the most thoughtful
Christian observers of American culture today.
Especially since I feel that pain too: like Smith, I
adore Berry even as I head to the nearest superstore to fill my trunk with bourgeois goodies at
discount prices. So as I read Smith's confessional
observation, I'm busted too.
Imagining the Kingdom, and its predecessor
Desiring the Kingdom, are books at the top of my
short list for recommending to friends and colleagues looking for a great introduction to the
writings of Smith, professor of philosophy at
Calvin College. Both contain scores of wonderfully illuminating moments of self-instruction
about the ways our own "worship" permeates
our everyday lives. If you think worship is something that happens only on Sunday mornings
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(and perhaps Wednesday nights, or during the
moments of devotion many Christians carve
out at the beginning or end of the daily grind),
Smith's books might shock you. Smith argues
powerfully that virtually everything we do constitutes some aspect of worship; everything
we feed ourselves will form us, whether we
recognize or accept that reality or not. And if you
are an educator like me, you will discover that
what you are primarily called to do is not dispense
"information;' but to foster "formation:' And you
will be engaged in a thoroughgoing examination
of just about everything surrounding the mundane
life you are now leading. In effect, you will be forced
back to the best of Reformed thought: Calvin's
insistence, as Matthew Boulton has recently
described it, that "even ordinary Christian life is
a disciplined life, a life of discipleship formed in
and through a particular suite of disciplines, and
so at every turn in his theological and reforming
work, Calvin sought to serve the church's broad
program of practical formation" (13). And so, yes,
if you take seriously such an account of discipleship as described by Calvin, you may even find
yourself challenged by the food court at Costco,
or by any number of other pre-cognitive choices
you must make, virtually every day, in postmodern America. Thus Smith is not for the faint of
heart, and his writing will shake you up, if you
let it.
All of this is preliminary to the book under
review here, because it helps to know a little bit
about Smith's earlier works and predispositions.
It is no exaggeration to suggest that his voluminous works are achieving a kind of epic sweep.

Smith may be a philosopher, but his works have
Taylor charts the historical development of
wide relevance throughout the humanities and, I
the main option that best characterizes our secular age: what he terms "exclusive humanism:' He
would think and hope and pray, throughout the
describes exclusive humanism's diverse legacy
church as well. I find him to be one of the most
from the early nineteenth century up to our own
engaging writers on issues of Christianity and
culture today, though his work is often not so easday, and then explores several current options of
belief and unbelief, especially in terms of how
ily digested (he is as fond of Bourdieu, Foucault,
these options deal with suffering and evil, and
and Merleau-Ponty as he is of Tom Wolfe, Homer
Simpson, and Death Cab for Cutie). And so, I am
the wide variety of ordinary life. Taylor rejects
treating this review as a bit
powerfully and persuasively
what he calls "subtraction
of an introduction to Smith's
stories": accounts of the develmost recent work, along with
opment of a secularism that
a review of his splendid, yet
accessible and brief overview
emerges by subtracting fea tures of transcendence, and
and discussion of what is
thus freeing us from illusions
arguably the most widely disor limitations that confine
cussed work of philosophy of
us. Think of subtraction stothe last twenty years: Charles
ries as accounts stressing how
Taylor's magisterial A Secular
an individual, or a culture,
Age (2007).
has decidedly "grown up":
Taylor's work is already
how any intelligent being
highly influential and very
must get beyond childish
well known among not only
belief by rejecting superstiphilosophers but also many
tion, or by suddenly waking
people working in literary
up and realizing that it is all
studies, religious history,
simply myth, as in the wildly
and other fields. Taylor was
condescending language of
already well-known before
Richard Dawkins (or, in the
the appearance of his masterWm . B. Eerdmans, 2014.
nineteenth century, someone
piece; his most famous book
like Robert Ingersoll, or even
before A Secular Age was his
his great admirer Mark Twain). For believers,
analysis of Western subjectivity in Sources of the
subtraction stories are certainly condescending:
Self (1989), and his Gifford Lectures were published as Varieties of Religion Today: William
they come across as very much like the ravings
of highly intelligent people who are nevertheless
fames Revisited in 2002. In A Secular Age, Taylor
tone deaf regarding matters of religion and belief.
addresses the problem of the foundations and conThat is how I have often felt when this arrogant
tent of moral value and all that such value involves,
attitude has raised its ugly head in what had been
a problem greatly complicated by challenges such
friendly conversations. Taylor is very good at
as Nietzsche's famous claim that God is dead.
Taylor asks, what is the most compelling account
describing this phenomenon, and for unmasking
it as a potential foe. Subtraction stories, for Taylor,
of life, and what is the normative status of this
way of life? He is hardly the first analytic philosoare merely the misguided rants directed toward a
pher to have recently taken on strong Christian
relatively weak and unconvincing straw man, not
commitments. But what distinguishes Taylor
a very serious argument at all.
(and, say, Alisdair Macintyre) is that these two
Smith's book, How (Not) to Be Secular, is thus
heavyweights deploy Christian commitments
to be highly recommended for the wonderful
within the framework of their analyses of the curhelp it provides in navigating the heady waters of
Taylor's masterpiece. Not only has it helped me
rent moral order, and how we got here.
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decipher the complexities of Taylor's work, but
Smith's lucid commentary has helped me master a
solid vocabulary of Taylorisms for use in my own
work (the book includes a very handy glossary of
terms). In short, Smith has taught me much more
about Taylor than I learned by reading Taylor on
my own. But this volume also reveals Smith to be
a master teacher; he tells us in the book's introduction that the idea, and the manuscript, emerged
from a semester-long senior seminar with
philosophy majors at his college, and he gives
a grateful nod to his willing students, who all
committed to reading the entirety of Taylor's
intimidating tome together with the class. What
a challenge! I've done Moby-Dick with seniors,
usually over about three or four weeks, so I know
the difficulties of Smith's gargantuan task-the
selling of a highly complex work of geniusand the marathon-like quality of assigning such
lengthy works (especially among the current crop
of so-called "digital natives"). I admire Smith's
courage and panache. His greatest gift may be
his ability to bring it all back down to earth, and
make it come alive, for a group of contemporary
undergraduates. Bravo for that.
Here I will try to boil down major elements
of the book's narrative. Since the goal of the
book is to explain and summarize the content of
Taylor's volume, we can assume Smith has broad
agreement with Taylor. He rarely argues with,
or disagrees with, Taylor's claims. According
to Taylor (and, evidently Smith agrees), the
modern world emerged when an internal and
self-sufficient humanism began to become imaginatively available as a real opportunity. The
single goal of this humanism was nothing more
than human flourishing, and slowly intellectuals
began to realize that perhaps belief in God was
unnecessary for such an arrangement. And so a
new concept of life emerged: the "secular;' which
Smith describes brilliantly. This new world is not
characterized so much by the absence of God as
by a "sort of contested, cross-pressured, haunted
world that is 'secular' -not a world sanitized of
faith and transcendence, flattened to the empirical" ( 17). Smith shows how the church became, in
Taylor's view, complicit with the changes in belief:
"Taylor focuses on Christian responses to this
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emerging humanism and the 'eclipses' we've just
noted. What he finds is that the responses themselves have already conceded the game; that is, the
responses to this diminishment of transcendence
already accede to it in important ways (Taylor
will later call this 'pre-shrunk religion'.. .)" (51) .
In short, Taylor (and Smith) argue that there is
in fact much to admire about the new order, even
as there is much to despise; for instance, our contemporary obsessions about "freedom" are only
imaginable within a modern, human-centered
frame. But more broadly, this new, pluralistic,
and open-ended culture represents the progress
of the human imagination over many centuries:
"exclusive humanism is an achievement: 'the
development of this purely immanent sense of
universal solidarity is an important achievement,
a milestone in human history:.. . Indeed, discovering immanent resources for fullness and meaning
in this way will become 'the charter of modern
unbelief:.:' (57) . In many ways, this new "secular" spirit has fostered inclusion and other forms
of justice. So there are good, as well as bad, results
of this "achievement;' a revelation hard for many
Christians to comprehend.
In this new order, questions of theodicy
have become foremost among the challenges to
Christianity. Smith is excellent in describing these
challenges, via Taylor's engaging and thorough
recognition of the seriousness of these challenges.
"People in coffee houses and salons .. . begin to
express their disaffection in reflections on divine
justice, and the theologians begin to feel that this
is the challenge they must meet to fight back the
coming wave of unbelief. The burning concern
with theodicy isn't framed by the new imagined
epistemic predicament" (52) . In other words,
many Christians today do not take seriously the
challenges posed by widespread violence and
horror, what philosophers call the problem of
evil. This line of reasoning, the recognition of
the need for a humble theodicy in light of evil,
may remind some readers of the recent volume by
David Bentley Hart, Th e Doors of the Sea . Hart's
ingenious point is that most believers have not
taken Ivan's (and Dostoyevsky's) argument in The
Brothers Karamazov as seriously as they should.
This epic novel-considered by many to be the

most definitive account in literature of the theodicy problem-represents, for Hart and Taylor, a
crucial challenge in the history of Western religion: "Those Christian readers who have found
it easy to ignore or dispense with the case that
Dostoyevsky constructs for Ivan have not, I submit, fully comprehended that case .. :' (Hart, 42).
As Taylor puts it: "The failure of theodicy can
now more readily lead to rebellion, because of
our heightened sense of ourselves as free agents"
(306). Strikingly, it is the church that is least prepared, at present, to deal with horrendous evils:
largely due to its unreal grasp of evil's fullness
and its implications. Evangelicals, in particular,
are nervous about admitting to the grand silences
of God or their own inability to offer up a quick,
scriptural remedy to any problem. But while the
church struggles to grasp the moral implications
of genocide and tsunamis, the fallen world totally
gets it. Taylor, Hart, and presumably Smith all
agree that the formulation of a satisfactory theodicy must become a crucial point of emphasis for
Christian belief and practice today. But instead,
the church fails to present a convincing response.
In effect, and like it or not, our highly touted
"freedom" in America has in fact led to all sorts
of new positions and new options and endorsed
them all equally. The epistemological cat is out of
the bag, in other words, and we should be dubious about any feeble attempts to rebag it. There
is grandeur in that realization, as well as some
real challenges. Identifying the causes of this
shift is at the heart of Taylor's (and Smith's) project: "the positive shift that really made exclusive
humanism a 'live option': a theological shift that
gave us the impersonal god of deism coupled
with the intellectual and cultural Pelagianism
that found the resources for an 'agape-analog'
within the immanence. This gave us a way to be
rid of eternity and transcendence without giving up a 'moral project' -a vision and task that
give significance to our striving" (Smith, 60).
One example of Taylor's vocabulary for describing these momentous shifts has become my own
personal favorite: the "nova effect;' which is "an
explosion of options for finding (or creating) 'significance: The cross-polemics that result from
new options for belief and unbelief 'end up gen-

erating a number of new positions ... so that our
present predicament offers a gamut of possible
positions"' (Smith, 62). There are just so many
options, and opinions, out there: just ask today's
students, inundated with too much of everything.
"[W]e see ourselves adrift and cast into an anonymous cold 'universe;" says Smith (71). And as
Taylor elaborates in a chapter entitled "The Dark
Abyss of Time": "Reality in all directions plunges
its roots into the unknown and as yet unmappable. It is this sense which defines the grasp of the
world as 'universe' and not 'cosmos'; and this is
what I mean when I say that the universe outlook

The bottom line is this: our secular
age presents unprecedented
challenges not only for belief itself,
but also for the simple presentation,
and the long-term progress, of our
narrative of truth, the Gospel.
was 'deep' in a way that the cosmos picture was
not. Humans are no longer charter members of
the cosmos, but occupy merely a narrow band of
recent time" (Taylor, 326-7).
Dark abyss, indeed. Perhaps readers might be
forgiven if they find much of this analysis fairly
bleak, if not abjectly hopeless. Taylor (and Smith)
offer some tips for the church and individual
believers, but their work is largely descriptive, not
prescriptive. The bottom line is this: our secular
age presents unprecedented challenges not only
for belief itself, but also for the simple presentation, and the long-term progress, of our narrative
of truth, the Gospel. The risks are unprecedented,
due largely to the nova effect of our "liberation;' our
growing up into full maturity in a world marked by
indecision, uncertainty, and thousands oflive wire
options. Who is to say what we can truly believe?
Thankfully, if we find this analysis troubling,
Smith has given us-in his trilogy on worship,
mentioned at the beginning of this essay-a
deeper engagement with the kinds of prescriptions
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that might help us, as the church, to find our way
forward. In a word: it is practice, the disciplines of
our faith. The search is on for real, vibrant communities of hope in the midst of this dark abyss we
call the secular age. Any hipster can sit at Costco,
sipping coffee and reading Wendell Berry. But as
my own college students are fond of asking me:
where are the living, breathing, authentic believers
in God to be found? They search, in other words,
because somehow they know intuitively that it is
within the disciplines of a beloved community
that we might learn how (not) to be secular. 't
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Thinking About Love
How Love Reveals Where We Are,
Where We Are Going, and Why
lan Clausen

T

O THINK ABOUT LOVE IS LESS EXCITING

than to feel it, and perhaps that is why
love receives scant critical attention. As
often as we invoke it, we seldom stop to think
about it, and this leaves us assuming that we
agree on what it is. But can love be defined, or
should it? There are those who think that love
defies all definition. To define it takes the wind
out of the sails of love's passion, and spoils the
spontaneity of its dynamically radiant presence. Love, it seems, stands outside the remit of
reflective knowledge, transcending our meager
attempts to lay hold of its content. And at any
rate, who among us has the right to define love?
Surely no one but the lover in whom love comes
to dwell, we insist, has any right to define the
feeling and its ultimate significance.
Modern philosophy is not much better
at thinking about love, though for somewhat
different reasons. The French philosopher JeanLuc Marion expresses outright dismay at the
silence of modern philosophy on so crucial a
topic. Surely philosophia, the love of wisdom, has
abandoned her vocation upon failing to tend to
the basis on which her discipline rests. Marion's
project is to recapture what he calls "the erotic
phenomenon:' This is the condition without
which philosophy becomes unintelligible to
itself and on which hangs the intelligibility of
even calling ourselves human. Surely the basis of
our humanity commands closer attention! Love
in fact invites us to examine its form, structure,
and content, in order to derive from it crucial
insights into the human condition. With all due
respect to Descartes, Marion puts it thus: "I love,

therefore I am." Try as we might to isolate love
from the self-the project of modern philosophy, in a nutshell-the self becomes intelligible
to itself only by existing through love.
If this is so, then in order to learn the truth
about ourselves, we need to reconceive ourselves
as lovers on the way. That invites us to think again
about the meaning of love, and to seize upon the
questions that this thinking provokes, in order
to open up a conversation on the significance of
love for revealing essential aspects of the human
condition.
Love is a Place

The first claim we wish to make is that love
is a place; love, that is, presupposes our placement in the world. To occupy a place involves
several components. One major component is
the presence of a beloved, an object to which
one feels attracted and summoned. No one loves
in a vacuum. The statement "I love" is a vacuous one; it cries out for some description of the
object one loves. By object, of course, we do
no mean mere object or "thing:' We are talking about the grammar of the activity of love,
the fact that we cannot love without also loving
something (or someone) . This condition presupposes our placement in the world. In order
to love something I need to be somewhere, for
that somewhere serves as the condition for the
possibility of loving something. Here is a good
example: I arrive on the university campus for
the first time as an undergraduate, when suddenly a beautiful face overtakes my field of
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vision. This face might have caught my eyes in a
different setting, a different place, but the present context renders my encounter with this face
rather special, and indeed, I come to believe that
I am "falling in love;' as freshmen are wont to do
in the first weeks of term.
In this encounter, the significance of my
placement comes home. It feeds my deep need to
establish roots through belonging, and it ma~es
this foreign place the "university" more inviting,

[We] cannot simply describe
ourselves as individual
monads, selves-in-isolation,
but rather find our ((selves"
ever searching for a place to
belong, a place to call home.
investing my presence there with significance
and purpose. All that may seem straightforward
and trivial on the surface, but it conceals an
incredible truth about the thing that makes us
human. For this condition ultimately reveals
something important about ourselves: we cannot
simply describe ourselves as individual monads,
selves-in-isolation, but rather find our "selves"
ever searching for a place to belong, a place to
call home. Freshmen know this feeling well. On
campus for the first time, they are separated
from home, and the isolation shapes their initial
experience of the place they now reside. Not
to belittle their encounter with that beautiful face, but falling in love seems to effect
for them a necessary transition by initiating
the next phase of their journey to adulthood.
It solidifies their sense of place by giving
their love a concrete object and by granting
them freedom from their former affective
attachments (such as a high-school sweetheart).
What is more, parents recognize this change is
taking place, and good parents remain patient
with the transitioning process. Conversely, it
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is tragic when the child fails to form attachments, only to return home feeling despondent
and disillusioned about the future. Though
quietly they may relish their child's longing for
"the way things were;' parents know that their
child needs to form new bonds of affection lest
the time at university fails to facilitate his or her
development.
But this process does not signal merely a
transition to adulthood, important as that is, but
it also indicates the child's opening to a much
larger world, indeed the world, as well as to the
question that is implicit to the journey. This
question will occupy us momentarily. First, I
want to call attention to an account of human
love that to my mind precisely captures this ohso-human experience. In his recent book Love: A
History (Yale, 2011), British philosopher Simon
May argues that true love is misunderstood. It
isn't unconditional, disinterested, or impartial,
despite our assumption that these constitute true
love. Rather true love is thoroughly conditioned
by the object that attracts, and more importantly
by our desire to find a home in the object. May
puts it thus: "Love ... is the rapture we feel for
people and things that inspire in us the hope of
an indestructible grounding for our life. It is a
rapture that sets us off on-and sustains-the
long search for a secure relationship between
our being and theirs" (6).
May's definition of love no doubt invites a
thousand qualifications. Does it really capture
what we mean by the word love? Is it not an overly
romanticized, even religious definition, one that
deals far too much in feelings and emotions? Yet
according to May, the confusion really lies with
us, particularly, that is, with our modern devotion to "unconditional love:' To understand true
love as essentially unconditional, May argues,
renders opaque the true nature of the human
love-relationship. However we might define
the true nature of God's love-and May has his
doubts about the project-it does no good simply to transplant the standard of divine love to
the realm of human relationships where it makes
no sense. In fact, May argues that, conceptually
speaking, there is no such thing as unconditional
love. Love involves by definition some kind of

condition, some modicum of a need and desire
that must be filled. To return to our previous
example: the freshman student who falls in love
has one basic need, one condition that governs
and inspires her longing, and that is her desire
to find a place to belong, an object/person that
can grant her an "indestructible grounding" for
her life.
In the end, May argues, it is our desire to
"come home" that conditions and complicates
the human experience. Yet there is more than
meets the eye in this conception oflove, and this
requires adding another component to flesh out
our understanding. Love is not only a place. It is
also, and perhaps first of all, a direction.
Love is a Direction

Rowan Williams puts his finger on precisely
this issue when offering a pithy account of the
human condition. In his Lenten book Christ on
Trial: How the Gospel Unsettles Our Judgment
(2003), Williams writes: "The hardest thing in
the world is to be where we are" (21, 89). I take
it that Williams is not intending to be literalthough sometimes it is literally hard to be where
we are, e.g. in a boring lecture!-but rather gesturing to the claim that we opened this essay
with: the fact that "to be" implies our status as
lovers. Love, however, is never simply a state we
inhabit, but a dynamic process of exchange and
intimate participation. It is in fact a direction
much more than a state, for to love someone is
to move with them and be moved by them. Yet
even before we are moved by the one we claim
to love, we are restlessly seeking someone or
something to love. Thus, the phenomenon of
freshmen falling in love brings to light the desire
that implicitly drives us. Not that this desire
must always seek romance, though it often does,
but that it always stands behind and directs
our existence as a powering motivation of the
restless human heart.
Williams's message is that "where we are"
invariably invites a struggle. That is because of
who we are as lovers on the way. Philosophers
like to call this the "ecstasy of being." The Greek
term ekstasis means "to be or stand outside

oneself, a removal to elsewhere" (Wikipedia).
It involves a kind of displacement of the mind
or soul, which in turn explains love's search for
a place to call home. Understanding this aspect
of love is critically important. The Christian
mystic Simone Weil, in a moving essay entitled
"The Love of God and Affliction;' describes the
peril that surrounds our misconception of love.
"It is only necessary to know;' Weil writes, "that
love is a direction and not a state of the soul. If
one is unaware of this, one falls into despair at
the first onslaught of affliction" (81). By affliction Weil means more than suffering, and much
more than physical suffering, though it must
include that. She defines affliction as "physical
pain, distress of soul, and social degradation, all
at the same time;' an experience she likens to a
"nail whose point is applied at the very center
of the soul, whose head is all necessity spreading throughout time and space" (81). To unpack
the riches of this description would take an essay
in itself. To give it some initial context, Weil is
clearly referring to the Crucifixion of Christ.
The Cross of Christ, she suggests, provides the
perfect model of "extreme affliction;' for here is
concentrated all the horror of human depravity
and cosmic necessity. And yet, Weil further suggests, it is enough to know, even in this darkest
moment, that love is not a state; it is a direction. "The hardest thing in the world is to be
where we are:' But to know that "where we are"
is always in some sense incomplete; that we do
not find here the ultimate grounding for our life,
even despite the loves we so deeply and rightly
cherish; to know that much, suggests Weil, not
only prepares us to endure affliction, but also the
quiet question at the heart of human existence.
The freshman who falls in love may well fall
out of love, and through this she may come to
know herself as a lover on the way. One fears,
however, that the way in which we moderns
experience romance has caused us to lose sight of
its transcendent horizon. And not only romance,
but also the love of wisdom: that rapturous
desire which once seized hold of Augustine and
Boethius, Catherine and Hildegard, and today
Williams and Weil, as well as countless other
saints and figures dotting the Western cultural
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landscape. Where did it go? Does the love that
moves us, directs us, no longer open us to the
big questions?
Love is not just a place, not just a direction:
it is fundamentally a question that is given to us,
and which invites us and entices us to make a
response.
Love is a Question

To make this claim, admittedly, moves us
beyond easy agreements. One can expect general
agreement that love is a place and a direction,

A true lover is ultimately a person
who hears the question of existence
and is unwilling to let it be answered
by empty sentimental platitudes.

but to derive from these aspects of love a corresponding question-a question such as "what
is the meaning of life?" or "why am I here?''strikes some moderns as dangerous thinking
or simply a dead-end. One example will suffice.
In an interview with the English philosopher
Simon Critchley, the interviewer asks Critchley
to respond to the challenge posed by Nietzsche:
if God is dead, wherein do we find meaning for
our existence? In "human finitude;' responds
Critchley, and he goes on to explain:
[T]he answer is given in the question.
The only answer to the question of the
meaning of life has to begin from the fact
of our human finitude, of our vulnerability and our fallibility .... [W]e have
to, in a sense, give up the question of the
meaning of life, or at least hear it in a
particular way... [O]nce we've accepted
that the meaning of life is ours to make,
we make meaning. Then we accept that
we live in a situation, or, rather, that
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we inherit a situation of meaninglessness, and out of that meaninglessness
we create meaning in relationship to the
ordinariness of our common existence.
(quoted in Stauffer 2003, 1)
The point of citing Critchley's response is not to
take him out of context-readers should visit the
online interview to hear his full opinion-but to
show that what we think about love has cosmic
significance and forces us to face questions that
destabilize assumptions.
Critchley may well be right about the
meaninglessness of modern life, but does his
proposal that we create meaning finally satisfy
as an answer? How might this be determined
philosophically or otherwise? The simple fact is
that we cannot just determine it abstractly. The
answer, or rather the question has to be lived
with and through, and this requires time and
patience as we labor in search of truth. I very
much doubt that many people have a desire
to "live with the question;' to borrow another
phrase from Williams, but that reflects more a
culture ill-attuned to such encounters, and possibly a bit adverse to any "threat" of disruption.
On this score, I must agree with Critchley's
proposal of acceptance as the first step to us
admitting we have a question to face. What I
cannot understand, though, and what makes
reading thinkers like Critchley exhausting, intellectually and spiritually, is that the answer to our
deepest question lies ultimately in us; that "we
make meaning" can create for us the home that
we desire.
There is another perspective, another
mythos of desire, that distills the human condition into a simple but startling truth. It is a truth
that thinkers like Critchley believe has had its
final say, and yet it is a truth that continues to
form a people learning to live with the question.
A strange intervention takes place in Genesis
3:9. Humanity has tried to recreate itself to be like
God, knowing good and evil, and God reenters
the story to pose a curious, destabilizing question: Where are you? And that question, should
love possess the characteristics we described,
might well sum up the journey that humanity

undertakes. It certainly helps to organize our preceding reflections by bringing love's meaning to a
culminating point. That point finds expression in
the famous words of St. Augustine: "You stir man
to take pleasure in praising you, because you have
made us for yourself, and our heart is restless
until it rests in you" ( Conf 1.1.1). By reflecting
on the love that both places and disrupts us, we
re-embody the (dis)position that awakens us to
the question. Nothing determines outright that
we shall answer it as Augustine does, but then
nothing can force us to disregard the answer he
gives either. A true lover is ultimately a person
who hears the question of existence and is unwilling to let it be answered by empty sentimental
platitudes. The great challenge facing modern
Christians is to resist such platitudes, and to learn
ways of embodying the question God raises to
humanity. Where are you? f
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DEAR LODESTAR, TRUE NORTH
dear drop of light spilled across 3am
sky asleep in the heart of the bear
you are asking again September questions
only the gone shine of your siblings long fallen
ago in an age of embers on earth
before the first humans traced you
in ocher & charcoal, painted you
on rock & skin, oracle riddled onto bones
of the dead your even more ancient
orbit alone knows the answer to
how could flickering you have known
a sieve slept in the little of your dipper
almost invisible to my homesick eye
wanderer, faraway, whispering lullaby

John Fry
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Does the Symbol Really Function?
What Theology Can't and Can Do
Robert Saler

W

HEN

I

TEACH SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, A

key early moment comes when we
read Elizabeth Johnson's classic text in
feminist theology, She Who Is: The Mystery of God
in Feminist Theological Discourse. This 1992 text
(since reprinted in multiple editions) remains a
classic exploration of nascent feminist themes
in the Bible and subsequent Christian tradition;
however, what is particularly helpful about the
text is the clarity with which Johnson argues for
the importance of theological discourse itself in
shaping our worldviews and ways of
being human:
As the focus of absolute trust, one to
whom you can give yourself without fear of
betrayal, the holy mystery of God undergirds and implicitly gives direction to all of
a believing person's enterprises, principles,
choices, system of values, and relationships.
The symbol of God functions. Neither
abstract in content nor neutral in its effect,
speaking about God sums up, unifies,
and expresses a faith community's sense
of ultimate mystery, the world view and
expectation of order devolving from them,
and the concomitant orientation of human
life and devotion. (Johnson, 4)
Johnson's point is crucial to her project, because
the brunt of her argument is that the language that we use for God will have deep
implications across our worldviews and actions,
including how we treat others. If we can only envision God as male, then there cannot help but be
repercussions that strengthen patriarchy across
cultural and political realms. If we regard God
as having ordained the United States of America
to a status of exceptionalism, then that will have

implications for how we engage geopolitical
realities, particularly in times of conflict.
In the past several decades, this notion-that
our ideas about God have a direct and discernible
correlation with our political and ethical attitudeshas become entrenched as a standard justification
for why theology matters as an academic and
ecclesial discipline. Indeed, it has been virtually
axiomatic within theological discourse that the
manner in which we construe and depict certain
theological symbols-salvation, the Eucharist, the
person of Christ, the nature of divine providence,
etc.-will have predictable outcomes upon the
behavior of those who take such symbols seriously.
To take just a few examples:
The elevation by "social Trinitarians"
of God- images that emphasize God's
existence as Triune community rather
than solitary monad is thought by these
theologians to provide us with divine
grounding for more open, vulnerable,
and egalitarian communities on earth.
On this model, Trinitarian perichoresis
(that is, the indwelling of the persons of
the Trinity within each other) becomes
a model for more authentic/less dominating human interaction.
The recovery-over against the popular
apocalyptic perspective represented
in, say, the Left Behind novels-of the
book of Revelation's vision of Christ's
redemption as encompassing all of
creation, and not just humanity, is
championed by ecological theologians as a framework for encouraging
Christians to value the natural environment. If we understand nature as the
arena of Christ's redemptive activity
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and not simply as the dispensable backdrop against which salvation occurs, so
the theory goes, then Christians will be
more motivated to care for creation.
Explorations into the problem of evil
that emphasize that God is capable of
genuine suffering, in contrast to those
strains of the patristic and medieval
tradition that emphasize God's immunity from privation, are thought to
promote a vision of power and love that
is more humane and less patriarchal
than their alternatives.
There is no question that this mode of theologizing-predicated on the belief that analyzing how
embedded theological assumptions produce deleterious social effects in order to propose (or recover)
other symbols that might motivate more salutary
ways of being in the world-has catalyzed a great
deal of excellent theological reflection across global
and denominational lines. Feminist, black, liberation, womanist, process, and a whole host of other
vital theological movements have constructed marvelously creative and faithful reworkings of core
Christian symbols on the belief that these could be
made to function in ways that might make the world
a more just and beautiful place. These achievements
should be celebrated.
But if "the symbol functions" has become an
established piece of theological orthodoxy, then like
all bits of orthodoxy it should be critically appraised
every once in a while to see if it still can withstand
the stress tests of Christian life in the twenty-first
century. And in that spirit, we might have reason
for concern.
First, we should notice that one of the effects,
perhaps unintended, of this line of thinking is that
it provides constructive theologians who might be
anxious about the very legitimacy of their discipline
(perhaps especially, but not exclusively, within university contexts) a seemingly unassailable rationale
for their work. If our theological symbols and what
we do with them have the power to make the world
a better or worse place, then the utility of theology
then becomes defensible on the same grounds by
which one might argue for the use of political science or philosophy: critical reflection has political
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results. I know that I myself have been known to
stand in front of classrooms and make impassioned
pleas to rows of skeptical students that, because
symbols function, theology has "real world"
importance.
But here we might wonder whether it behooves
theologians-who, after all, really ought to know a
bit about how easily good intentions lead to delusion-to be especially self-suspicious when their
methods of justifying their disciplinary existences
end up highlighting the utilitarian value of Godtalk in ways that make themselves indispensable on
some supposedly neutral, rational calculus of what
really "matters:' On a theological level, it seems that
a discourse which has at its heart a broken criminal on a cross ought to be highly cognizant that
nowhere does the fallen character of the world
manifest itself more clearly than in agreed-upon
standards for what constitutes "relevance" and
"success:' Meanwhile, at ground level, it is not at all
apparent that, despite the massive number of books
and articles produced in the field of constructive
theology every year, theology as a discipline has
been particularly effective in its purported aims
of changing human behavior. Put bluntly, if the
axiom "the symbol functions" is predicated upon
the potential of theology to change the world, then
theologians should assess in all humility the extent
to which that potential has been realized.
Such an honest assessment might lead us to
realize that one of the most philosophically and
theologically significant facts about human beings,
religious or otherwise, is our deeply rooted ability
to live in cognitive dissonance with (if not in outright contradiction to) that which we affirm to be
true and good. Indeed, not only are we capable of
massive cognitive dissonance, but a whole host of
structures have the capacity to absorb our "correct"
theologies into systems that remain fully undisturbed by our changed worldviews. As a Christian,
I affirm the primacy of charity and God's love for
the poor even as my pursuit of a stable middle-class
existence is, quite honestly, no less enthusiastic than
that of my "secular" friends. If asked, I would affirm
that I value family more than my career, but I suspect that my Outlook calendar would tell a different
story. When I preach, I find myself telling congregations that the infectious joy of the Gospel is too

large for us not to share the good news of Jesus
Christ, even as I am well aware of how easy it is for
me to keep absolutely silent about my Christian
faith in settings where I don't think that it would
be welcomed.
A cheap solution to this dilemma would be to
say that we must not "really" believe what we say we
believe if there is no apparent correlation between
what we affirm about God and how we live. But far
better than such superficial stratagems would be to
acknowledge that there is a certain na:ivete in thinking that the connections between what we want to
believe and how we actually live will ever be direct
and predictable.
If we concede this, then all is not lost for
theologians; indeed, far from it. When one looks
to the depths of the Augustinian tradition, for
example, one sees a whole host of powerful trajectories that explain how we are caught up in webs of
self-deception and dissonance from what we know
to be good in ways that escape our understanding,
much less our control. Indeed, in recent years a
whole host of secular philosophers (in deep contrast
to the "new atheists") have drawn appreciatively on
specifically Christian theological themes in order to
have conceptual material for articulating facets of
the human project that standards of Enlightenment
rationality simply cannot comprehend. And this
has only been amplified in our global context by the
West's encounter with modes of human flourishing
that are quite foreign to our own traditions (and
perhaps helpful for precisely that reason).
But to mine those insights requires that theology give up any pretense to being a self-sufficient
discipline or a kind of Rosetta stone that can decode
human actions and instead embrace deep interdisciplinarity in order to see how insights about the
human condition are articulated within the realms
that study it: literature, art, political science, philosophy, the sciences, and so on. Just as one cannot
responsibly engage in theology without some basic
levels of competence in these disciplines, then it
does seem legitimate to point out that the development of these lines of inquiry have, throughout
history, been so deeply imbued with theological
notions (Christian and otherwise) that competent deployment of the symbols of theology have
the potential to shed light on precisely the areas of

wisdom that these disciplines seek to articulate.
When the rewards of disciplinary dialogue are so
potentially great, then monologue becomes not
only impractical but also unethical.
Another way to say this is that, in theology,
the distance between what we believe and the
sort of systems of behavior that we perpetuate
is in fact among the most interesting objects for
investigation; however, that investigation is best
carried on in collaboration and not the pretense of
self-sufficiency. If we have had reason in these last
decades to lose faith in our symbols' ability to "function'' in any straightforward or utilitarian fashion,
then we should not yet give up hope that they can
work in tandem with other realms of knowledge to
shed some light, however imperfectly, on the ways
in which our fragile attempts at realizing the good,
the true, and the beautiful in our own experience
are sometimes met with disaster beyond our control and sometimes graced with success beyond our
deserving. Indeed, there is a good argument to be
made that this is what theology has in fact always
been: a discourse that seeks to make sense of the
fact that both death and life (in the fullest senses
of each term) are distinct possibilities at any time,
and that how we orient ourselves toward God has
implications for how authentically and humanely
we navigate that uncertainty on earth until that day
that "we know as we are known'' (1 Corinthians
13:12). Whether or not such discourse produces
practical results, it might produce richer lives. ;-
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He Said; He Meant
Tom Willadsen

"Every profession has its growing arsenal
of jargon to throw dust in the eyes of the
populace."
William Zinsser, On Writing Well.
AST SUMMER

L

I

SPENT EIGHT DAYS AT A

seminar for mid-career Presbyterian ministers. I cannot remember a better organized
continuing education event. As I tried to describe
the experience on returning home, I remembered
a conversation I had, repeatedly, with a member of
my congregation.
"How are you, Lyle?"
"I can't complain:'
"You could if you tried! Put some effort into it!"
Lyle could spend half an hour telling me why
he does not complain, though he has some darn
good reasons to; complaining is just not for him.
Besides, he would add, "It doesn't do any good
anywaY:'
I suppose I could find things to complain
about. The third day at supper as I went through
the buffet, I grumbled, "Cheesecake! Again?" But
even this was a mere parody of the complaining that I am now completely indifferent to from
members of my congregation. It was a high quality event all around. I'm left to meta-complaining,
complaining about the fact that there was nothing
to complain about.
Some of my colleagues asked whether I
was taking notes for one of my humor columns.
And I told them, in all sincerity, "You're all so
professional, ethical, healthy, and differentiated that there's really nothing funny to write
about:' Maybe the fact that this event was only
open to mid-career pastors had something to do
with the quality of our cohort. The first ten years
of ministry presumably weeded out the
incompetents and knotheads.
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I found myself laughing at some of the jargon
that we used. For example, one of my female colleagues said that her "growing edge" was "learning
to say 'no~' At a basic level, this is hardly a skill one
needs to perfect. Your garden variety two-year-old
has it down pat. Still, clergy tend to be "quivering
mounds of availability;' as we were reminded at the
opening plenary lecture. Many of us find ourselves
overcommitted, stressed, and facing professional
burn out because we cannot say "no:'
On our lone off-campus field trip we went to
a variety store that could have been in Mayberry
about 1961. For sale was a little battery powered
device that said "no" one of six different ways each
time its button was pressed. "No:' "No, no, no, no,
no, no:' "No!" It's the kind of thing you can laugh at
for thirty seconds, even though it will sit on your
desk for twenty years. Still, it made me understand
that there are lots of ways to say "no;' and the savvy
pastor should be able to say it more than one way.
There are different "no's" I use as a father too.
Currently, one model I'm using a lot is, "My 'no'
is not the beginning of debate:' This one comes in
handy with my fifteen year old. It has the finality of
a cigarette snubbed out into a full ash tray.
When the president of my congregation's
Presbyterian Women's group invites me to the
fall retreat in Oconto, I cannot simply say "no:' I
need to say something like, "It's kind of you to ask
me, but ..." or ''I'm flattered that you thought of
me, but. .."
Other invitations can be declined more
forcefully. Miss Manners suggests using a
combo-platter of "That won't be possible" and "It's
simply out of the question" alternated until the
favor asker gives up.
A few years ago someone taught me the different meanings of "Bless her heart;' when spoken by
Southern women. I now use this phrase as a verbal
crossed fingers behind my back. I say "Bless your
heart;' but I mean:
•

Each day in my prayers I lament
that you had children, or
As far as I can tell, your sole
purpose on this planet is to irritate
everyone you encounter, or

•

Given a choice between having
white-hot tungsten spikes thrust
through my lungs, and accepting
your invitation, I'm going with the
spikes, or

•

Remember that device I told you
about that measures my hostility?
Your request has rendered it obsolete, or

•

I hate you.

My favorite way to say "no;' is "''m sorry, I
have a subsequent commitment:' This one goes
back to the Watergate hearings before Congress.
There was confusion about the meaning of "subsequent;" some witnesses used it meaning "prior:' No
one caught this then, and no one has caught it in
the twenty years I've been saying it. It's completely
honest. "Tom, wanna do this thing at my house
that sounds tedious and awful?"
"No thanks, I have a subsequent commitment:' And I always find that I do. Subsequent to
the invitation, I am committed to doing something
else, like playing Uno with my kids or vacuuming the station wagon or sitting in the living room
staring off into space. These commitments I find
much more rewarding than viewing the YouTube
video of your visit to the podiatrist. Go ahead
and think my commitment was prior to your
invitation; I told the truth.
Sometimes ministers decline invitations by
saying, "That's not my gift:' One of the nice things
about having twenty years of experience is the selfknowledge that other people are better suited to do
something one has been asked to do. Not that this
task is not worthy of attention, it is. Other people
are better suited to do this.
Non-church professionals convey this same
idea by saying, "I suck at that:' I, personally, use
this phrase in church settings; I find one of my gifts
is to use vulgarity to jarring effect. It works for me;
I shit you not.
Another bit of jargon I heard at the conference was, "Hold me accountable:' As in, "When
I get back to the office, I'm going to ask my
secretary to really hold me accountable on this:'
The lay equivalent of this phrase is something like,
"Nag me, p1ease."

Clergy who are working too hard and need
to step back say, "''m giving myself permission to
- - -:· I have always found this to be a tedious
expression of desperation because usually we permit ourselves to take a day off, or not leave the
shower to answer the phone. We have to excuse
ourselves to live ordinary lives, as if we're slipping
back into the phone booth and taking off the cape.
Please. Take your day off, then take a second day
off, from the guilt of taking your day off in the first
place.
The bit of professional jargon I learned last
summer was, "Let's unpack that:' This is a very
handy bit of verbal punctuation. The savvy pastor, when attacked, repeats the charge, then says,
"Hmm, let's unpack that. .." then proceeds to
explain, calmly and clearly, using 'T' statements, at
least five different ways that the person making the
attack is wrong, perhaps delusional. For maximum
effect, the pastor should fiddle with a pipe.
Finally, I fell into using this phrase at the conference, "That's a Family of Origin Issue:' I found,
again for the millionth time, that my family of
origin marked important occasions with food.
We marked unimportant occasions with food.
We communicated almost entirely with food.
And we hated to waste anything, especially food.
Food is more than fuel to us. It is currency; it is
love. Food is what you eat; it is what eats you. So
when I speared the last bite of cheesecake off a
neighbor's plate (I really, really thought she wasn't
going to eat it because her family of origin is from
"The Anti-Clean Plate Club Planet:'), it's a Family
of Origin Issue. That sounds so much better than,
'Tm batshit crazy:' It really means, "Compared to
the people who raised me, I'm pretty OK. You're
not gonna leave that piece of crust on your plate,
are you?"
At least that week I gave myself permission to
do that. ;
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Images of the Invisible
Ryan Rickrode

HEN I WAS A KID I DIDN'T LIKE JEsus.
from first-century Palestine. That he was not
I was baptized as an infant and brought
immediately recognizable to his captors-that
to church every Sunday, and I didn't
Judas had to identify him with a kiss-tells us
doubt the existence of God, God was a fact, as
he was, at least in the minds of the Gospel writwere Heaven and Hell, and I feared all three: God
ers, an average-looking guy. He had dark skin
who was always watching, Hell for the obvious
and curly hair, and drawings from the firstreasons, and Heaven because I imagined it to be
century suggest he would have kept his hair cut
a Lutheran church service that had no end. I'd sat
short. The average height of a Jewish man in his
through grown-up church, had watched the adults
day was only 5'1", but it is not hard to imagine
stand and sit, had heard the organ thunder, and
that he would have been broad-shouldered and
I'd come to believe that what God demanded was
strong; he was working class, the son of a carabsolute obedience-no mistakes, not ever-and
penter or stonemason if we accept what Matthew
that Jesus, like a heat shield,
tells us. He addressed crowds
was the only thing standing
of thousands long before the
between me and God's wrath.
invention of the microphone,
and according to Mark he
Jesus I was leery of. In
Sunday School, we sang "red
spoke with more authority
than the established religious
and yellow, black and white, we
are precious in his sight;' but I
leaders of his day. According
didn't buy it. Behind that smilto the Gospel ofJohn, he drove
ing cartoon face on the flannel
the moneychangers from the
board, Jesus was harboring
temple with a whip. He was
not a soft-skinned weakling;
some serious passive-aggressive
tendencies. He was coming
he was executed as an enemy
of the state. He was dangeragain to judge the living and the
dead, and his forgiveness was
ous. He was also probably
conditional: Jesus really only
dirty and tattered and more
liked nice people. Doodling on
than a little scraggly, as he
the back of the bulletin durWarner Sallman, "Head of Christ," 1940·
walked almost everywhere.
ing church was okay, but spreading out a pack of
His weather-beaten face would have made him
cards and playing solitaire on the pew (I quickly
look older than his years, but I imagine he had
learned) was a good way to get on Jesus' bad side.
a good smile. The Gospels make it clear that he
What Jesus liked were wholesome-looking chilwas hugely popular, especially at parties, and
dren of assorted skin tones and baby lambs that he
that he was not against a little bit of wine. He had
could cuddle. He was not an anything-goes sort
compassion and patience, and he liked people,
especially the down-and-out and unimportant.
of guy, and he looked just like Warner Sallman's
Head of Christ.
He gave priority to children in a culture that rouWhat I know now is that he would have
tinely practiced infanticide, and he did not smite
his disciples when they bickered with each other.
looked like what he was: a working-class Jew
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According to Luke, as he was dying on the cross,
he cried out, "Father forgive them for they do
not know what they are doing:' He would have
looked nothing like the anemic, effeminate figure we find in much of Western art. As my friend
Corinne once put it, "He probably looked a lot
like Bin Laden:'
It did not occur to me that Jesus was not a
white guy until I was a sophomore in college. I was
doing research for a paper on the Gospels, standing in the stacks at the library flipping through
the second volume of J. P. Meier's Marginal Jew: ·
Rethinking The Historical Jesus when I noticed
that the Jesus on the dust jacket was a Semitic
man whom I'd at first mistaken for Moses. In the
moment this epiphany felt deceptively small-of
course Jesus wasn't a white guy!-and it wasn't
until I returned to the Gospels to read them
not with the critical eye of a religion major but
with the devotion of a believer that I felt the full
force of this discovery. The problem was-and
remains-this: When I try to immerse myself in
the stories of the Gospels, to really absorb them,
it is all too often the petty white Warner Sallman
Jesus of my childhood whom I see healing the
leper, teaching the disciples, crossing the surface of the sea. No matter how carefully I piece
together the kind, scruffy person I know he must
have been, that image is always shattered and it
starts with his skin. I want to see it copper brown,
the way it surely must have been, but that image
is exploded with white, not just Caucasian white,
but a fluorescent white that I'm sure would have
made Jesus stand out to his captors on the night
of his arrest.

W

ARNER SALLMAN' s FAMOUS 1940 OIL

painting The Head of Christ has been
reproduced over half a billion times,
on plaques, bookmarks, church bulletins, funeral
cards, Christmas cards, calendars, buttons, coffee
mugs, stickers, billboards, key chains, and, in the
1950s, on glowing "Inspira-Clocks" and "InspiraLamps" (Grimes 1994; Prothero 2003, 116). A
copy hung in my grandmother's apartment, and I
saw it after church every Sunday.
The painting's first printing in 1941 produced a hundred thousand copies that sold out

in two months. By the end of the year over a
million copies had been purchased, and the following year sales tripled (Prothero, 117). Many
of these first prints were wallet-sized copies that
were mailed to American soldiers fighting overseas or, later, distributed domestically through
the "Christ in Every Purse" program, an initiative that aimed to counter the influence of
"card-carrying Communists" by creating "cardcarrying Christians" ( 117).
By the time the appeal of the painting began
to wane in the 1960s, American culture had
grown too divided for any one image of Jesus to
displace Sallman's, so Sallman's Jesus became the
Jesus, the Jesus of our culture's collective imagination, the one we regularly spot on burnt food,
stained surfaces, fuzzy x-rays, and Family Guy
episodes. The painting is, in the words of historian Stephen Prothero, "a twentieth-century
version of the Shroud of Turin;' an image that
purportedly reveals not only Jesus' personality, "but also the shape of his nose and cut of his
beard" (ll8).
Sallman himself allegedly claimed that the
image came to him in a dream; there he was,
seated at his drawing board, the picture already
complete. When he woke he went to work recreating what he had seen, and while I don't
doubt Sallman's heart was in the right place as
he sketched, I am troubled by the way Sallman,
his admirers, and his distributors have so readily removed Jesus from the world he actually
inhabited. Gone in Sallman's work are the details
of time and place that help us understand who
Jesus really was. The painting came to Sallman
in a dream, and its accuracy was attested to by
people who encountered Jesus in dreams of their
own.
In America we have always been good at taking Jesus out of context and refashioning him
in our own image. Shortly after the Louisiana
Purchase, Thomas Jefferson did it with scissors.
He sat down with four copies of the Bible, clipped
out all the Gospel passages he deemed "authentic;' and created the first draft of what would
eventually become known as the Jefferson Bible
(Prothero, 23). The task, he later wrote to John
Adams, was "obvious and easy;' the authentic
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passages "as easily distinguishable as diamonds
in a dunghill" (Jefferson, 1813). Jefferson's redaction omitted 90 percent of the verses found in
the Gospels-no healings, no miracles, no resurrection-and instead presented Jesus as a moral
philosopher (Prothero, 25) who probably would
have felt more at home with Jefferson in the Age
of Enlightenment than in first-century Palestine
where, as even some of today's most skeptical
scholars have pointed out, magicians and miracle
workers who healed the sick and cast out demons
were accepted as facts of life.
Similarly, during the ruggedly masculine era
of Teddy Roosevelt American Christians published books that placed a heavy emphasis on
Jesus' virility, books with titles like Manhood of
the Master and The Manly Christ: A New View. In
The Masculine Power of Christ, Jason Noble Pierce
told his readers that Christ possessed "virile
power which every man may share, which makes
every man great" in much the same way that
Laurie Beth Jones, during the prosperous, politically correct mid -1990s, told her readers in Jesus
CEO that Christ had "many feminine values in
management" and that "his approach with his
staff often ran counter to other management styles
and techniques" that she had encountered (Pierce
1912, 2; Jones 1995, xiv). Even more recently,
four days before the 2012 presidential election,
CNN published an online article titled "Do You
Believe in a Red State Jesus or a Blue State Jesus?"
The piece came complete with a ten-question
Cosmo-style quiz: "Do you believe Jesus was a
healer who provided free universal health care?''
(Blake, 2012).
It was at the end of the "manly Christ"
craze that a teacher at the Moody Bible Institute
encouraged a young Warner Sallman to take up
the subject of Christ in his art. "Make Him a real
man!" the teacher reportedly told him. "Make
Him rugged, not effeminate. Make Him strong
and masculine, so people will see in His face
that He slept under the stars, drove the moneychangers out of the temple, and faced Calvary
in triumph" (quoted in Doss 1996, 80). It's not
bad advice, grounding Jesus within the narrative
through which we are able to know him, but it's
advice Sallman seems not to have taken.
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While critics over the years have skewered Sallman for the androgyny of his Jesus,
Prothero argues that the broader contextual
ambiguity of the image may actually have been
the key to the paintings' incredible popularity:
Sallman divorced his subject entirely
from the biblical narratives. Instead
of interacting with his disciples or his
mother or even with God, Sallman's
Jesus engaged the viewer directly, and
he did so in a way that was inviting,
reassuring, comforting, and intimate ...
Different Americans could read different
Jesuses into it, and apparently they did
just that. The picture sold spectacularly
well among evangelicals, who claimed
Sallman as one of their own. It was
also popular among liberal Protestants
and some Roman Catholics, in part
because ... it was not identified with
any one denomination or any particular
theological stance. (119)
Untethered from his historical context and narrative framework, Sallman's Jesus was pliable
enough to support or oppose any cause, including Communism. The painting sold well, as
Prothero points out, not only among conservative evangelicals like Sallman himself, but also
among Catholics and liberal Protestants who, in
the 1940s and 1950s, were both eager to set aside
denominational differences in order to present a
unified front against godless Communism. The
"Christ in Every Purse" program drew praise
from both Dwight Eisenhower and J. Edgar
Hoover (Prothero, 11 7).
The pliability of Sallman's Jesus, however, can
be seen even more clearly in the smaller behavioral "miracles" attributed to the painting. In
Virginia, a businessman reported to Newsweek
that no one in his office had cursed since he'd
put the picture on his desk (Morgan 1996, 188).
In the Midwest, one pastor's wife made her son,
whenever he acted out, stand before the portrait
and "tell Jesus you're sorry" (188). One copy even
reportedly saved its owner from being robbed
at gunpoint. "Lady, I can't do it;' the thief said,

"not with him behind you" (188). In essence, by
presenting Jesus apart from any sort of narrative
or cultural-historical backdrop-and thus apart
from any specific claims about who Jesus was and
what he did or didn't stand for-Sallman created
the perfect banner for American Christians to
rally beneath: a nice Jesus.

I

N THE BIBLE JESUS IS CALLED "THE IMAGE OF

the invisible God;' "the exact imprint of his
very being;' a living symbol, a synecdoche
with legs (Col. 1:15; Heb. 1:3). Christianity has
always maintained that by looking at Jesus we
glimpse God, and so for Christians the quest for
a deep and true historical understanding of Jesus
is, in the words of New Testament scholar N. T.
Wright (1999), "part of, indeed perhaps the sharp
edge of, our exploration of God himself" (15). His
skin color matters not because skin color should
matter, but because accuracy matters, or should
when we're picturing someone as important as
God.
During the Reformation, many Protestant
leaders attempted to do away with religious
imagery altogether. Calvin reasoned that since
it is impossible to picture God we shouldn't try,
and he banned all representations of God in
human form from his churches (McGrath 2006,
210). According to the Swiss reformer Huldrych
Zwingli, the ideal church was to be free of any
and all distracting and potentially idolatrous art,
its walls whitewashed and unadorned to prevent
believers from becoming distracted from the
reading and preaching of the Bible (209). Such
intense caution, however, as well-intentioned as
it may have been, is not a solution to the problem of misleading religious images, but an error
in the opposite direction. If a Jesus without context is ultimately meaningless, so too is a God
who cannot be pictured. After all, isn't the God
of Christianity a God incarnate, a God fond of
parables and metaphor, a God who descends
to meet us where we are? "It is a small step;'
writes historian Alister McGrath, "from declaring that God cannot be pictured to suggesting
that he cannot be conceived as a living reality
in the rich imaginative life of humanity" (212).
He argues that the "failure of the Protestant

imagination" helped give rise to the functional
atheism (i.e. Christians living their daily lives as
if God's existence didn't particularly matter) that
contributed to the rise of outright intellectual
atheism in the centuries that followed.
And so I choose to cast my lot with those
like novelist Madeleine [Engle, who shares
with the Orthodox iconographers the conviction that Jesus of Nazareth "did not walk around
Galilee faceless" (1980, 26). Though she's no fan
of paintings that portray Jesus as a "tubercular,
fair-haired blue-eyed goY:' [Engle still believes
that a faithfully rendered image of Jesus can act
as "an open window through which we can be
given a glimpse of the love of God;' and I agree
(26). The images of Jesus I'm drawn to, the ones
I choose to hang on my walls, are the images that
somehow ask for my surrender, the images that
draw me through themselves into a place where I
am invited to contemplate who Christ really was.

I

N 2002, A FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGIST NAMED

Richard Neave created a digital reconstruction of Jesus' face, that is, a reconstruction of
the face of a typical first-century Galilean man
(Fillon 2002) . After examining period artwork, taking CT scans of skulls uncovered near
Jerusalem, and studying the accounts ofthe Gospel
writers, Neave confirmed what should have been
obvious: Jesus was not a white guy. The face
of Jesus, he concluded, would have looked
something like this:

Jesus as depicted in Son of God.
BBC, 2001 .
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Which is to say that, for me, the face of Jesus is
the face of a stranger. He is not someone I would
recognize if I passed him on the street or sat
next to in a pew, but maybe that's a good thing.
Maybe it is the mystery that keeps me leaning in
when I read the Gospels. When the two disciples
on the road to Emmaus encountered Jesus they
didn't recognize him. They spent the afternoon
walking and talking with him-telling him
about the rumors of his own resurrectionbut they didn't recognize him, not even when
he interpreted for them the things written
about himself in their scriptures. It wasn't
until he took the bread, blessed it, broke it,

and gave it to them that he suddenly fell into
context and they saw who he was. His identity
was revealed to them, and he disappeared. ;-

Ryan Rickrode studied creative writing and
religion at Susquehanna University and in
2013 earned his MFA in creative writing
from the University of Montana. His work
has appeared or is forthcoming in The

South Carolina Review, Identity Theory,
Lalitamba, and The Common.
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BEKENNTNIS DER SUNDEN
Confession is where my new church
begins. Come clean early
before rattling off hymns, remembering
ourselves piousSomeone has chosen a new song.
Even the choir mumbles through,
except for Mrs. Maud. Discorded
unity. We each hold a different note
and I'm glad I don't know
the two girls laughing behind me,
don't join in like I used to.
I'm a woman now, I guess.
Like a good Lutheran, I've learned
to carry on. We sing words unsure
and sure our souls. Grace or mercy?
At church camp, I never knew
the answer. Learned faith was messy.
Look at us. We imitate, render His sky
with finger paint like kids paint people:
no bodies, just faces, hands.
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Richard Linklater's Boyhood
A Long Series of Goodbyes
Gregory Maher

8

OYHOOD OPENS WITH A TRANSITION: THE

family around which the film revolves is
moving out of their home, and we get the
full sense of its home-liness just before it is gone. The
family packs and prepares to sell their house; there is
work to do. Single mother Olivia (Patricia Arquette)
plops paintbrushes in her two children's hands with
orders to make the walls-which are well-grafittied
with youthful art-look new. In this moment, in
the face of erasure, we suddenly notice the marks
that signify presence, the individual histories of the
children. A wide shot shows the children paintingafter some grousing-and then switches to a
close-up shot of a doorframe. The frame is marked
with the familiar etchings of height, pen and pencil
scrawled to mark the stages of growth. Suddenly the
marks are gone as a paint brush sweeps a thick glob
of white downwards, seemingly erasing the progress
of the children. Scene change.
This opening scene creates a kind of sick tension
of moving forward into the unknown while saying
goodbye to the present, the comfortable. And this
tension carries the viewer through the film, through
twelve years during which the characters age through
fads, fashions, and relationships that stir us with
the embarrassment and nostalgia of old Facebook
photos. Director Richard Linklater plays Olivia
against father Mason Sr. (Ethan Hawke), a divorced
couple who cross paths time after time as they
each seek their own fulfillment in other partners.
Children Mason Jr. (Ellar Coltrane) and Samantha
(Lorelai Linklater) follow Olivia from home to
home in a fugitive cycle, tenaciously holding on to
their family despite external circumstances and the
unsavory cast of characters Olivia marries.
Texan Richard Linklater is masterful in his
poignant use of reality, in all its awkwardness, its
fleeting pain and joy. Treating the aspirations and
obsessions of the 1990s, Linklater's films often share
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"a concern with characters adrift. Everybody... is
somebody in between, somebody who used to be a
student or used to have a job, somebody who hasn't
quite figured out what he's going to do with his life"
(Rick Barton, "Grunge Cinema: Five by Three for
x:' The Cresset, December 1994). Progression turns
hollow in the face of disturbance and pain, in the
realization that life cannot be contained in a lapse of
grief, nor rest in happiness too long. His characters
often seem to be stunned at moments into clarity, to
then be lost again as they wage a futile battle with
time. Think of Linklater's Dazed and Confused,
the story of an impulsive, hazy, all-nighter that is
underlain with the knowledge that the moment will
end, that dawn will come and the party will fade into
a mythic past. A moment is ephemeral, undecided
in the face of the constant, and distinctly human,
push for control. Linklater finally leaves the essence
of growth, of what a boy- or girl-hood is, at the
potency of a moment.
Cinema often serves as a distraction from reality,
but Boyhood can't necessarily fulfill this purpose
because it draws from the very grains of sand which
comprise reality: endless seconds and moments of
lives. Linklater's style revels in detail: the warmth
with which a mother strokes her son's straw-like
hair, the "likes" and adolescent colloquialisms of
Mason, a point-of-view shot as Hawke unzips to put
out a campfire the "old-fashioned waY:' The movie
is idiosyncratic in its span of creation: over twelve
years the cast and crew gathered for weeks at a time
to film. This allowed Linklater time for reflection
as a writer, to respond to and include details of his
actors' lives as they aged with their characters. The
dialogue, some of which is drawn directly from
real-life conversations actor Ellar Coltrane had with
girls at parties, is rehearsed, beaten in until it aligns
with the rhythm of reality. This is not to say it was
spontaneous or improvised-Linklater rehearses

his actors with vigor-but that there is a kind of
reality that cannot be merely taped as documentary.
Hand-filmed segments are necessarily limiting
because they lack the effortful illusion of cinema.
The director must allow the performances to appear
as natural, human, and poignant as possible. More
remarkable is the ability of these actors to both draw
from their own experiences of aging, and to see
their previous work edited and refined as reference
before performing further scenes. The film becomes
a theater of life, performance after performance,
each responding to the last. You can't help but grow
with the characters and invest in their lives.
Boyhood finds its greatest potency in reminding
us that there is art in the moments that make
up our lives. That-with each turn-from the
first lost tooth to the first gray hair, there is some
abiding enchantment. Too often the transitions,
the ephemera of our lives, are cut away like lengthy
hair to leave those few snapshots which lay framed

behind glass. And sometimes we humans forget the
art of living. It is easy to forget, say, the significance
of a child's haircut, cleanly shifting appearance for
a time, or the first scintillations of interest between
two teenagers, shared in a walk or awkward
conversation. Each moment passes by, streaks
backwards with millions of other routine moments,
stockpiled or dumped in our collective memories.
How, for example, can I not connect to my
own youth? And doesn't this seem like Linklater's
purpose, to draw us not merely into the rosy memory
of nostalgia but to re-member, to confront the

formative and often painful moments? As Mason's
stepfather takes him to get his hair cut-"your hair
makes you look like a girl"-the barber's Longhorns
cap and shirt with old trucks make a painful
caricature. Mason sits in the chair, hair drooping over
his eyes as the barber goes to his age-old task. New
stepfather Bill stands watching, lips pressed, belly
pushed out and arms crossed confidently above. It's
a massacre. You can see it in Mason's eyes afterward,
the shock of losing an identifier, something which
distinguishes and allows autonomy in at least
that regard.
But this scene is moreover important in how it
is echoed, indeed reified so many times over a child's
boy-or-girl-hood. The father figure, otherwise
fearing that his own manhood will be questioned,
becomes a mouthpiece for unseen rules of gender.
Manhood is displayed by not sticking out, and short
hair fulfills normativity by not being noticeable;
later in life Mason deliberately contradicts these
norms by wearing purple nail polish and
sporting an earring. Androgyny becomes
a weapon against relentless stepfathers
who resort to a one-track power trip: the
I'm-the-one-who-pays-the-bills. It also
reflects the kind of cultural androgyny
toward which fashion and appearance
shifted in the 1990s, think blue jeans
and flannel for instance. I was struck,
not by the eerie ease with which I could
replace Mason with myself, and Bill with
my own father, but by how I still felt the
pang of discomfort, the vague feeling that
perhaps I am still measured under these
constraints. Boyhood for Linklater is a
schema in which gender, like identity, is
unfixed, constantly navigated through life, and
perhaps unknowable.
It is easy to start consuming the film, to eat up
the moments almost voyeuristically. The camera
in this sense is very intimate with its characters,
growing with them over the twelve years of the
film. At times, it takes the place of an absent father,
looking over its shoulder to the fighting siblings in
the back seat as mother Olivia implores "Okay, we're
going to play a game: Whoever can stay quiet the
longest wins. And, go!" Or it nudges up to Mason's
face, reveling in the awkwardness of half-formed
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thoughts and conversations with girls. At its most
revealing, it hovers tenderly above Mason in bed
with girlfriend Sheena before a roommate walks in
and disturbs the scene. The viewer pulls back with
the camera, tingling with the awkwardness of the
situation.
At its best, the camera allows close-ups in which
micro-expressions reveal human experience (a
credit to the actors). The viewer reads a character's
face as if in conversation herself, reminded
of conversations in which each actor-in
life-tries to get past the fa<;:ade of another,
to something more human. Sometimes it
is unwanted, as Mason (often a stand-in
for the camera, a silent observer) notices
looks between his mother and men she
meets. Here we see a look of perplexity,
the child's undesired experience of the
thought that a mother might be dateable,
attractive even. Poet Allison Joseph sums
it up better than pop psychology: "Did
you want to know that your parents were
human too?"
How poignant, then, that Mason's
mother keeps falling into the same flawed
cycle of new home and new husband who turns to
alcohol, as her two children continue to age. This
"character drift" is often a linchpin of Linklater's
characterization, a vague awareness that there is
something terribly important to be found in a
moment, an experience, or late at night, drifting
within a black haze. But then the character wakes
up, the next day has arrived, and that haze-and
its accompanying mystery-has vanished with the
routine light of morning. Ultimately, Arquette's
character breaks down as she helps Mason pack
for college and realizes a new emptiness of her
surroundings: "I knew this day would come, except
why is it happening now?"
What happens, Linklater questions, in that
push, in that demand to know, control, and live in
a steady beyond, a future always one step ahead
of the present? For Olivia, life becomes a series of
losses: ''I've spent the first half of my life acquiring
all this stuff. Now I'm going to spend the next half
getting rid of it all:' Artifacts do, after all, populate
the movie. A birthday shotgun, a carefully-curated
mix cd, a handle ofTito's Vodka hid behind laundry
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detergent. Each object becomes a representation of
desire, material fulfillment at surface level, but too
often a sign of emptiness.
The potency revives in the final scenes, a heavy
expectancy that gilds the fresh nervousness of
Mason going to college. He meets his roommate,
accepting an offer to go hike the rust red hills of
a nearby park with his roommate's girlfriend, and
her roommate Nicole. Clearly a set-up. Mason and

Nicole hang back, discussing how moments of life
seize or are seized. With alarming clarity, Mason
describes that in fact, they are always in the moment.
Mason, who appears so lost to adult characters who
question his identity, his drive, and his obedience
to societal standards seems to emerge. Through the
haze of a life half-lived, the view through the window
beckons. Linklater uses the landscape of Texasand a distinctly adrift family-to remind his viewers
that life is rich with the present, even while so many
films urge us to distraction, to escape. So Mason
and Nicole sit atop sunset -crowned boulders as
the conversation continues ... and halts in awkward,
warm moments of interest. "What next;' we wonder,
as Mason stares searchingly into the eyes of this new
companion. "What next?" t

Gregory Maher is a writer living in Chicago.
He covers art and architecture for KNSTRCT
Magazine, and contributes to The Seen
contemporary art magazine.
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Fragment ed Ways of Seeing
Cinematography and Morality in Scandal and Sherlock
Jennifer Miller

N

EAR THE BEGINNING OF HIS 1972 BOOK

Ways of Seeing, the English art critic John
Berger emphasizes that the act of seeing is
more than just looking; rather, "we are always looking at the relation between things and ourselves:'
As a result, Berger explains, images are more than
just a perfect, objective record of what was seen.
Instead, they "embod[y] a way of seeing;' the relationship between the person creating the image
and the image itself. Take the example of the photograph. As Berger explains, "Every time we look at a
photograph, we are aware, however slightly, of the
photographer selecting that sight from an infinity of
other possible sights. This is true even in the most
casual family snapshot. The photographer's way of
seeing is reflected in his choice of subject:' In this
way, an image is more than just a representation of
a subject. It is also a representation of its creator's
relationship with the subject, as well as the viewer's
own understanding of the image and its place in the
world.
While Berger's analysis focuses on still images,
his argument that the way in which we see affects
how we understand can be applied to moving
images as well. For example, the television show
Scrubs, which aired on NBC (and later ABC)
from 2001 to 2010, told the story of employees at
Sacred Heart Hospital, focusing on a young doctor named J. D., who is prone to daydreams and
ridiculous fantasies. Unlike many sitcoms, Scrubs
used a single-camera setup, which gave the show
a stark grounding in reality in spite of J. D:s wild
imagination.
The effect of this camera setup became particularly apparent during the season four episode,
"My Life in Four Cameras:' The episode began
with J.D. telling a patient he has lung cancer, Dr.
Cox firing a cafeteria worker, and Turk and Carla
(two of J. D:s best friends) having relationship

problems. After J. D. comments in a voiceover,
"There are moments when we all wish life was
more like a sitcom:' the camera setup shifts from
the usual single-camera to a multi-camera setup,
complete with bright lighting and a laugh track.
Everything takes a turn for the better, leading up to
a talent show that magically fixes all the earlier conflicts. As J. D. turns to deliver the voiceover to end
the show, his patient collapses, and J. D:s colleagues
rush to help. J.D. looks on, saying, "Wait-this
isn't right;' a comment that draws attention to the
incongruity between the cinematography and the
direction of the plot. At that point, the camera shifts
back to a single point of view, the lights darken,
and reality sets back in. The shifts in camera setup
throughout this episode underscore how the way
in which we see affects how we interpret what we
are seeing, a fact particularly important when analyzing the carefully constructed shots of television
shows and films.
Thinking about these ways of seeing draws
attention to a cinematographic technique used
in two recently popular shows-ABC's Scandal
and the BBC's Sherlock-that gives viewers a way
of seeing moral ambiguity in the actions of key
characters. Scandal centers on the character of
Olivia Pope, the head of a crisis management
firm in Washington, DC. Pope, played by Kerry
Washington, is extremely good at her job, and she
sees her work as a way to fight evil in the world.
This is made very clear from the very beginning
of the show. In the first episode, Olivia's colleague
Harrison tells a future employee what it means to be
a part of Olivia Pope and Associates; he says, "We're
the good guys ... Best job you'll ever have. You'll
change lives, slay dragons, love the hunt more than
you ever dreamed because Olivia Pope is as amazing as they say... I'm a gladiator in a suit 'cause that's
what you are when you work for Olivia:' This theme
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of being a "gladiator in a suit" recurs throughout
the first three seasons of Scandal (the fourth season will air beginning in September 2014); multiple
characters use this phrase to describe the work they
do with Olivia. Olivia also frequently talks about
wearing her "white hat" as she fights for justice,
a phrase reinforced by the costumers of the show
who dress Olivia in cream-colored pantsuits, white
sweaters, and soft, light -colored fabrics. These elements work together to create the picture of Olivia
Pope as someone firmly on the side of good.
And yet things are much more complicated
than they appear. For starters, Olivia's personal life
is morally complicated; she is having an affair with
the married President of the United States. And
while the first season showed Olivia clearly fighting
to protect innocent people, seasons two and three
showed her rigging an election, manipulating the
lives of those close to her, and questioning her ability to accomplish anything good through her work
in DC. The lives of those close to Olivia reflect this

murky morality as well. Her sometime-boyfriend
Jake Ballard is a shadowy figure who initially
appears to be someone protecting the President,
but later episodes reveal that he works for a secret
spy organization. Huck, one of Olivia's associates,
uncovers information key to many of her investigations, but he often uses torture to acquire this
knowledge. Even the names of the second season
premiere and finale- "White Hat's Off" and "White
Hat's Back On'' -emphasize the shifting, uncertain
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nature of what is right and what is wrong in Olivia's
universe.
Returning to Berger's argument, the way
in which the show is shot reflects this ambiguous morality. A frequently used shot throughout
Scandal's three seasons-in fact, perhaps its visual
trademark-shows various characters, but particularly Olivia, through glass, making them appear
fragmented. For example, in one of the final scenes
in the season three finale, "The Price of Free and
Fair Election;' Olivia tells two of her associates that
she is leaving the firm, but throughout the entire
sequence, there is not a single shot of any of the
characters without some sort of distortion. Olivia's
colleague Abby speaks of the moral certainty she
once felt while working for her: "Over a cliff, Liv.
Over a clijj! We went over a cliff for you and you
just, you walk out on us?" Olivia reassures Abby
that she will be taken care of, but the fragmented
representation of this key decision calls into
question this promise of security. Even though
Olivia appears to ride
off into the sunset on
a jet at the end of the
season finale, the uncertainty and ambiguity
established by the cinematographic
choices
throughout the show
leave viewers doubting
that Olivia will remain
outside of the murky
morality of Washington,
DC.
A similar cinematagraphic technique is
used in Sherlock during the third episode of
season three. Sherlock is a twenty-first-century
retelling of many of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's classic stories. This particular episode, entitled "His
Last Vow;' is based on the story "The Adventure
of Charles Augustus Milverton:' The episode
pits Sherlock Holmes (Benedict Cumberbatch)
and Dr. John Watson (Martin Freeman) against
a newspaperman named Charles Magnussen,
who has information about most of the powerful people in England and uses it for blackmail.

Throughout the episode, viewers receive distorted
glimpses of scenes. As it opens, we first see a blurry
shot of someone's glasses, with the camera positioned below the glasses and the fluorescent lights
of the ceiling out of focus. Next comes a blurry
shot of Lady Smallwood, a government official
who is questioning Magnussen about his influence over the British Prime Minister, and we see
that Magnussen is sitting without his
glasses. As with Scandal, these noticeable visual distortions provide clues
that this episode of Sherlock deals with
uncertainty and ambiguity.
The nature of this ambiguity
becomes clear shortly after the opening scenes when Magnussen visits Lady
Smallwood and reminds her of compromising letters that her husband had
written long ago. When she accuses him
of trying to blackmail her, Magnussen
responds, "Of course it isn't blackmail.
This is ... ownership:' While blackmail
is clearly a crime, ownership is a broader
issue that occupies a less well-defined
moral space. Magnussen's use of information to influence politicians and even
entire governments falls into this space and could
be considered what Sherlock's brother Mycroft calls
"a necessary evil:'
While it would be tempting to attribute moral
ambiguity only to Magnussen, the episode rejects
such easy interpretation, both visually and in terms
of the plot. Dr. John Watson's dreams of combat
in Afghanistan, interspersed with memories of
Sherlock Holmes, are blurred around the edges.
John's visit to a drug house is marked with visually distorted shots as well. These visual effects are
accompanied by moments of uncertain morality.
Not only do we see John harm a man to gain information (and satisfy his own craving for danger),
but we also see Sherlock himself on drugs, allegedly
as part of his undercover work for a case. Midway
through the episode, viewers see fragmented shots
of Mary, John's wife, as part of a secondary plotline
involving Mary's secret past. The cinematography
used during these moments reminds viewers that
Sherlock, John, and Mary are complex, fallible
humans, rather than just heroes fighting evil.

However, as the episode progresses the ambiguity surrounding these central characters falls away.
As Sherlock and John fall back into their old routine, viewers are provided with mostly clear shots
of the two men, without any special effects. Shots
of Magnussen, on the other hand, continue to be
distorted. During his first meeting with Sherlock,
Magnussen at first can be seen only reflected in the

layered border of a mirror. Near the end of the episode, Sh(;!rlock tries on Magnussen's glasses, giving
the viewer yet another blurry look at this man who
balances on the border between citizen and criminal.
The ending of the episode seems at first to
resolve this distortion and to offer an exoneration of Magnussen. When he reveals to Sherlock
and John that his vault of compromising information is kept nowhere but in his mind, Magnussen
is seated in an all-white room, facing the camera,
without any distortion or blurriness, a portrait of
goodness and light. He even tells Sherlock, "''m not
a villain. I have no evil plan. I'm a businessman,
acquiring assets:' But in spite of both this visual
and verbal rejection of evil, it comes as too little,
too late. The consistent visual and moral distortion
of Magnussen throughout the episode is too strong
to overcome in the end. His death at the hand of
Sherlock brings instantaneous relief to the tensions
in the plot; moral and visual clarity once more
take precedence.
Michaelmas 2014

49

Although both Sherlock and Scandal employ
similar cinematographic techniques to represent
the ambiguous morality in both shows, the source
of this distortion is quite different. In Scandal, the
visual distortion comes from the outside, looking
in at Olivia and her associates through a window
or the lens of a camera. In Sherlock, on the other
hand, particularly in the opening scenes, the distortion comes as viewers are looking at the world
through Magnussen's eyes. This visual distinction
suggests that Olivia's ambiguous morality comes
as a result of external pressures, while Magnussen's
lack of dear moral categories is an intrinsic part of
his nature. Such a reading is further enhanced by
a plot twist late in the Sherlock episode; the glasses
Magnussen wears, which are the source of much of
the visual distortion throughout the episode, are
not embedded with a computer as Sherlock has

supposed. Rather, the secrets Magnussen keeps are
all stored in his memories, making his mind the ultimate source for his ambiguous morality. The visual
distinction between Sherlock and Scandal might
also explain why the only possible resolution of
"His Last Vow" was for Magnussen to die, eliminating his inherent moral uncertainty from the show,
while on the other hand, millions of viewers are still
eager to tune in to Scandal each week, hoping to
see Olivia push back against the world around her
and find her white hat once again, maybe this time
for good. ;-

Jennifer Miller teaches English at Normandale Community College in Minneapolis,
Minnesota.
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'Then Jesus took off his sugarcoat
& walked into the wild
like an aborigine; 2there he met beast after beast
that beheld him. And he
countermanded them, turning their appetites
into his flesh. 4 Their tongues,

I

I

li

reconstituted as deviled meat,
he stored under the roof of his mouth; 5 for he spoke

II

in parables. The hyena, caked
in blood, 6dreamed of a wedding cake.

L. S. Klatt
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Education for Bureaucracy
Peter Meilaender

E

ACH FALL, WHEN THE NEW ACADEMIC

year rolls around, a professor's thoughts
naturally turn once more toward
educational matters. Over the course of a summer,
jadedness gives way to fond hopes for what
students-under the professor's wise guidance, of
course-will accomplish. At the outset of Western
philosophy, in the Republic, Plato taught that
education was fundamentally about the shaping of
souls, surely as noble a task as one could imagine
embarking upon. Like the would-be philosophers
in the cave, each new batch of students must be
transformed. Their young souls must be turned
away from the shadows on the wall of the cave
so that they can learn to gaze upon the sun itself,
gradually coming to understand the nature of the
Good. How will I shape my students' souls in this
new semester?
I found myself pondering this question as
I took up one of the annual tasks of the new
year: updating my syllabi. Unfortunately, I was
prompted to such reflection less by optimism
or grand ambitions than by a sense of gloom at
the degree to which the soul-shaping is these
days driven by people with perhaps the smallest
of all souls: government bureaucrats. It seems
that we have some new syllabi requirements
to comply with this year. I was reminded of
this by an email from my associate dean, who
was dutifully seeking to ensure that we faculty
do what we are supposed to do, especially as
the institution where I teach undergoes the
decadal ritual of seeking reaccreditation. Not
all of the reminders were about entirely new
requirements, but one especially annoying and
useless-even annoyingly useless-requirement
was.
Beginning this fall, I am supposed to include
in my syllabi "time-on-task" expectations; that

is, I am supposed to indicate how much time
I expect my students to spend, on average,
completing the various course assignments.
For instance-just to borrow a few examples
from the new policy language in our college
catalog-they might spend "3 minutes per page
(approx. 100 words per minute)" completing
their "assigned reading"; or, if they are asked
to "participat[e] in online dialogue(s)" (as my
own students surely are not!), they can expect
this to require of them "1 hour for 5 postings
(original or in response to other posters), each
of which consists of at least 5 sentences or 30
seconds of recorded material"; or, in an almost
embarrassingly
conventional
assignment,
they might need to spend "1.5 hours per
finished page" completing the "writing/editing
component" of a "researched paper:' (This is
presumably the same thing as the more familiar
"research paper:') These estimates, I can assure
you, are the result of considerable "dialogue;'
much of it "synchronous;' but some of it also
"asynchronous" and "online:'
As unlikely as it might first seem, I owe this
inelegant invasion of my syllabi to the federal
government. It is no secret that higher education
has become a political issue of increasing
salience in recent years. The Department of
Education has therefore come up with a number
of "Program Integrity Regulations." Among
its accomplishments in this regard is to have
settled on an official federal definition of the
credit hour, the lack of which has long been a
source of profound concern among citizens
of all political persuasions. The United States
Department of Education defines a "credit hour"
as an "amount of work represented in intended
learning outcomes and verified by evidence of
student achievement that is an institutionally
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established
equivalency that
reasonably
approximates not less than: ( 1) one hour of
classroom or direct faculty instruction and a
minimum of two hours of out-of-class student
work for approximately fifteen weeks for one
semester or trimester hour of credit. .. :'
There is more, but that is the basic idea.
Before continuing, let us pause a moment
to ponder how much more successful
Socrates might have been in educating future
philosopher-kings had he only known this
definition, the Form of the Credit Hour, if you
will. Might he have been spared the hemlock?

The American public is overly prone
to populist anti-intellectualism, but
colleges and universities have made
themselves increasingly easy targets
over the last several decades.

It does not, of course, take a satirist of any

great skill to mock this sort of thing. So let me
preface the coming criticism by insisting that
I do not intend here to engage in any special
pleading on behalf of colleges and universities.
They have only themselves to blame for
becoming the objects of such scrutiny and have,
indeed, brought this fate upon themselves. The
politicization of campuses; the revolt against
much of Western culture and its values, and
thus against students' own homes and parents;
the proliferation of pointless majors and silly
classes; and, especially, the skyrocketing price
tag for enjoying all of the above have made
institutions of higher education into objects
of profound cultural suspicion. The American
public is overly prone to populist antiintellectualism, but colleges and universities
have made themselves increasingly easy targets
over the last several decades. So one can
reasonably defend the government's motives (if
not its actions or its common sense).
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Even the time-on-task requirements have a
reasonable explanation. The point of defining
the credit hour is to protect students and their
families against potential fraud. Ensuring
that a credit hour represents some reasonably
consistent amount of work, linked to measurable
learning, enables more meaningful comparisons
across institutions while creating barriers
against watered-down programs, especially
in new areas such as online and for-profit
education, where students risk spending money
to acquire paper credentials that are not what
they claim to be. Nor is the government itself
actually inspecting my syllabi (though the NSA
has no doubt read them thoroughly, even before
I have finished writing them). Rather, having
established the definition of a credit hour, it
entrusts the task of enforcing it in a consistent
fashion to the accrediting agencies. And the
easiest way for the accreditors to do that is simply
to require me to document the amount of work
that my course, which is ostensibly worth four
hours of credit, actually requires of students.
Hence the time-on-task reminder from my
associate dean, especially in light of our coming
re-accreditation review.
Even if this chain of cause and effect can be
explained as the product of reasonable motives,
surely the end result is absurd. Does any sane
person really think that my including in my
syllabi the amount of time it will take students
to accomplish various tasks will improve their
education? Surely not. But if not, why bother?
What is really going on here?
At moments like these-which unfortunately
are ever more frequent-! find myself wondering
whether we are witnessing a new stage in
the ongoing bureaucratization of society.
Bureaucracy, of course, has long been recognized
as a hallmark of the modern state; Max Weber
famously explained it in terms of the increasing
rationalization of society. But something like
this time-on-task requirement-which is closely
linked to the immensely powerful movement
in higher education for "outcomes assessment;'
alluded to in the credit hour definition's reference
to "intended learning outcomes" -does seem to
reflect a more advanced degree of regulatory mania

combined with silliness. (Readers in the field of
education will know all too well what "outcomes
assessment" is about. If you don't know what I'm
talking about, permit me simply to remind you
that ignorance is bliss.) As a working hypothesis,
I suggest that two social factors are combining to
drive this development. The first is the growth of
a knowledge-based economy, in which increasing
numbers of jobs are white-collar and highly skilled
workers are in ever greater demand. The second is
the continually increasing number of Americans
seeking a college education, fueled both by the
knowledge that a college degree pays economic
dividends and also by our continued political and
cultural insistence that everyone ought to go to
college.
This is a problematic combination. The
economy demands more and more intelligent
and talented people. So we seek to · satisfy
that demand by sending ever more people to
college. It cannot be the case, however, that
ever-increasing percentages of Americans are
highly intelligent and talented. It would seem,
therefore, that a society that produces increasing
numbers of college graduates over time is
necessarily producing increasing numbers of
people who possess paper qualifications that
overstate their actual accomplishments and
abilities. (In this connection, it is interesting to
note that the ACT, in its report "The Condition
of College & Career Readiness 20 14;' found that
while 86 percent of those students who took
the ACT in 2014 "aspired to postsecondary
education;' only 39 percent of them, based on
their ACT performance, had "a strong likelihood
of experiencing success in first-year college
courses:') What are such qualified-on-paperbut-only-moderately-talented people to do?
What sorts of jobs are suitable for them, jobs
consonant with their own sense of achievement
and merit but not actually requiring any great
level of wisdom?
These are precisely the sorts of people
who go on to become bureaucrats and middle
managers, deputy assistant directors of this
or associate junior manager of that. They
constitute an army of people requiring work
that seems important, regardless of how much

truly important work there is to be done. They
need to justify their existence, which they do by
passing continuous regulations and revisions
of regulations, which of course require in turn
still more mid-level bureaucrats to oversee and
enforce them. They derive satisfaction from
doing things like requiring faculty to include
time-on-task expectations in their syllabi, and
perhaps they even believe that in doing so they
are making the world a better place. Possibly they
represent a new sociological phenomenon-a
kind of combination of the "revolt of the
masses" with the "iron law of bureaucracy"in need of further study. Indeed, they would
probably be happy to study it themselves.
The Department of Education could create a
special commission, naturally with numerous
subcommittees,
to
study
"Bureaucratic
Expansion and the Knowledge Economy in a
Global Age:' Such a committee could then issue
a set of recommended "best practices" for the
rest of us to implement, complete with expected
outcomes and an assessment plan.
Tocqueville, as usual, saw it coming.
Classical political philosophers like Aristotle
understood democracy as the rule of the
poor, by which poor majorities systematically
sought to redistribute the wealthy's riches to
themselves. Tocqueville, writing as modern
democracy took shape, understood that equality
might take a somewhat different form and that
majoritarian mediocrity, instead of targeting
the wealth that emerged as talent's effect,
might pursue the more fundamental strategy
of negating inequality's cause by preventing the
successful assertion of talent in the first place.
In describing the new form of despotism that
he thought was a possibility in democracy-a
"brand of orderly, gentle, peaceful slavery" -he
worried that democratic government
extends its embrace to include the whole
of society. It covers the whole of social
life with a network of petty, complicated
rules that are both minute and uniform,
through which even men of the greatest
originality and the most vigorous
temperament cannot force their heads
Michaelmas 2014

53

above the crowd. It does not break men's
will, but softens, bends, and guides it;
it seldom enjoins, but often inhibits,
action; it does not destroy anything, but
prevents much being born; it is not at
all tyrannical, but it hinders, restrains,
enervates, stifles, and stultifies ...
Program integrity regulations
for
the
twenty-first century: a network of petty, complicated rules that are both minute and uniform.
As I comply with these enervating, stifling,
and stultifying regulations, I wonder: How am
I shaping my students' souls? When they see
my syllabus filled with things like time-on-task
expectations and learning outcomes, what
impression does it make upon their conscious or subconscious minds? Time-on-task
expectations, I fear, may send an implicit message that one should be satisfied with doing the
minimum amount of work necessary to get by,
clocking in for the requisite amount of time and
then moving on to something else. But more
importantly, will these young men and women
mistakenly come to think that intelligent people-many students, God bless them, actually
cling rather touchingly to the belief that their
professors are intelligent-actually regard all of
this stuff filling their syllabi as important? And
if so, will they begin to think like that themselves, or worse, even aspire to become such
people?
Perhaps such fears are unfounded. Students
often have strong, sound instincts for detecting
nonsense. But they also have powerful incentives
to imitate behavior that appears associated
with professional success. On more than one
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occasion I have had a student ask me if I had
a "rubric" for grading papers. (The first time
this happened, I had no idea what the student
was talking about. I have since become better
informed.) It would be disheartening indeed to
think that by my compliance with these sorts
of syllabi requirements-resistance, after all,
is futile-! am being co-opted as a participant
in the education of still more mid-level
bureaucrats.
The Harvard political theorist Harvey C.
Mansfield has long assigned his students, as
a protest against grade inflation, two separate
grades: their official grade, which appears
on their transcript and follows a typical
Harvard grade distribution, with lots of 1\.s and
A-minuses; and their "ironic grade;' that is, the
grade he believes their work really deserves,
with an average closer to C. (The practice
earned him the nickname Harvey "C-minus"
Mansfield.) Perhaps I need to follow a similar
practice with my syllabi. I could have two
versions of them: Version A, "for students who,
like Socrates, believe that the unexamined life
is not worth living"; and Version B, filled with
time-on-task expectations, learning outcomes,
and whatever else is to follow, "for students
whose ambition in life is to become middle
managers and bureaucrats." As Socrates knew
well, after all, there will always be many people
who prefer to remain in the cave. ;

Peter Meilaender is Professor of Political
Science at Houghton College.
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Beyond O utrage
David Lott

S
0

MANY CULTURAL CONTROVERSIES HAVE

erupted on social media recently that it
sometimes seems as if we have entered a
new era of public denunciation. Twitter recorded
the strong backlash against the outspoken writer/
musician Henry Rollins, who was compelled to
apologize for writing that Robin Williams's suicide made the much-loved actor unworthy of
respect. An outpouring of tweets also helped to
force Mozilla CEO Brendan Eich out of his job
as a group of his employees spread word that he
had supported Proposition 8, California's antigay marriage amendment. Student activists
organized protests online against the academic
dean of Duke Divinity School over remarks he
made at a new-student orientation that they considered inappropriate and homophobic. And Dan
Snyder, owner of the Washington NFL franchise,
is under constant fire online for refusing to change
the team's name, widely considered derogatory of
Native Americans. Many sports announcers and
media outlets refuse to utter or print the name
(which I won't use here!).
Incidents like these are proliferating, and they
have become the daily bread not only of political
activists and media commentators, but of millions of social-media users. A prominent person
or organization says or does something offensive
and is pressured to retract or mitigate words and
actions deemed socially unacceptable. The list is
long: Los Angeles Clippers owner Donald Sterling,
actor Alec Baldwin, television cook Paula Deen,
Duck Dynasty patriarch Phil Robertson, and
the late comedian Joan Rivers are just a few who
found themselves in hot water for overstepping
perceived bounds of decency in the last year or so.
The fast-food chain Chick-fil-A has been subject
to protests and boycotts because its late founder,
S. Truett Cathy, contributed to groups opposed to

same-sex marriage and gay rights. And my
Facebook feed lit up with calls for a boycott of Burger King after the fast-food chain
announced it was buying the Canadian coffee
shop business Tim Horton's and moving its headquarters to Canada, a move branded as a form of
US tax evasion.
Each episode exhibits a by-now familiar pattern: an offending behavior is exposed, publicized,
and "goes viral" through social media. Sites like
Facebook and Twitter explode with calls for the
offender to be "held accountable:' Corporate sponsors withdraw their support (or threaten to do so)
until the offender goes into damage control mode
and devises a suitable public apology or is otherwise censured. (And, to be clear, I consider the
domestic and child abuse issues that have dogged
the NF~ early in its 2014 season to encompass
an entirely different realm of objectionable, even
criminal, behavior that deserves widespread condemnation and discipline, as well as recognition of
the due process rights of the accused.)
These periodic flurries of intense public controversy typically culminate in a call for some sort of
"punishment" for the offender: Sterling was forced
to sell his team for his racist remarks; Baldwin
lost his MSNBC show on account of homophobic
insults directed at a photographer; both Deen and
Robertson were taken off the air for their words
and opinions-though both subsequently returned
to television, their celebrity enhanced. Only Rivers
seemed to flourish in the face of controversy, and
usually with no apologies.
But the uproar usually doesn't stop there.
Typically, a backlash against the backlash ensues,
and the efforts to sanction perceived offenders
are decried as "political correctness run amuck:'
Impromptu Facebook groups form to support
the accused, and the "comments" sections of
news outlets and websites are riddled with bitter
defenses and furious charges of hypocrisy, often
expressed more offensively than the initial incident
that provoked controversy. Leaders of religious
organizations frequently weigh in on the issue,
and not always to effect reconciliation or peace
between contending factions. What usually results
is a brouhaha: serious discussion is lost amidst
overexcited polarities and paroxysms of outrage.
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During these outbreaks of cultural warfare, we
are told that public figures must be "held accountable" for their words and actions. Tea Party activists,
for instance, denounce Republican politicians
whom most other people would consider already
very conservative. They celebrated the defeat of
former House Majority Leader Eric Cantor for not
holding closely enough to their ideals. I've concluded that the intensity of their animosity is not
strictly political and ideological. Rather, it masks a

We prefer our cultural opponents to
be invisible to us, and we will make
them so, if need be. The power to
marginalize is a tempation not
so easily resisted.

deep-seated urge to render a judgment and impose
a punishment for everyone to see, and fear.
But what explains the heightened forms of
cultural outrage increasingly displayed by selfidentified political and religious progressives?
People like me. We champion diversity and peace,
tolerance and reconciliation, priding ourselves on
being more fair-minded and even-handed than
our opponents. Yet, we can be just as self-righteous
and strident and unforgiving in our reactions to a
perceived offense. What's going on here?
Progressives may respond by reasoning that
we love justice and have contempt for hateful conduct, but even those honorable motivations can
be corrupted by darker impulses to which all people are prey, regardless of their persuasion. Thus,
we must give more thought to the increasingly
poisonous tone of our public discourse, even
if what we discover is discomfiting. Let me propose
the following three, admittedly tentative, theses.
First, I think the urge to punish is our way of
reclaiming power in a seemingly hostile cultural
landscape. We know the incendiary or insensitive
comments of a Paula Deen or Alec Baldwin may
have a disempowering effect, especially upon
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those who feel targeted. But instead of responding
with measured anger, we choose to demonstrate
our power over those who earn our disapproval.
We pronounce ourselves offended, then demand
"accountability;' a passive-aggressive way of showing that we, too, can hurt back. The language
of reconciliation never comes into play (except
sometimes, as at Duke Divinity School, from the
offending party, which should always be met with
healthy suspicion).
Second, anyone who has studied American
social history knows that the marginalization of
gender and minority communities has deprived
millions from active participation in our nation's
development. Women, racial and sexual minorities,
the poor, and other disenfranchised groups have
contributed to the many splendid achievements
of progressive reform movements but continue
to face barriers to full inclusion in American life.
This creates an ironic situation for many who subsequently claim a place in a privileged white male
world: the once-marginalized begin to use their
newly acquired access to power in ways that can
all too easily make them marginalizers themselves.
Now it's our turn to exile and condemn.
Such reflexive marginalization-particularly
when it is directed against public figures-often
fosters in us the illusion that we inhabit a society
and culture that matches our ideals. Anyone who
punctures that ideal image must be sidelined or
silenced or made invisible: take them off the air
(Deen), fire them from their jobs (Baldwin), force
them out of their positions (Sterling), take away
their livelihoods (Eich). Never mind that millions of the so-called silent majority hold similar
views but lack a public platform or media profile
to make their voices heard. We prefer our cultural
opponents to be invisible to us, and we will make
them so, if need be. The power to marginalize is a
temptation not easily resisted.
And this leads me to my third thesis: despite
what we say, progressives are as ambivalent about
free speech and civil liberty as our counterparts.
We may deplore censorship and intolerance, we
may declare our commitment to diversity and
hatred for discrimination, but the diversity we
recognize and accept has boundaries. Religious
fundamentalists, cultural conservatives, and the

like are fair game for exclusion. Too often we
announce our support for working-class people,
but do we respect-or even hear-their often
culturally conservative voices? We fantasize about
the impact of corporate boycotts on wealthy executives and stockholders, but do we take into account
their impact on minimum-wage workers and
struggling franchise owners? We reject making
employment subject to political litmus tests, but
when public records reveal Brendan Eich's $1,000
personal contribution in support of Proposition 8,
we're out for blood.
I think one reason why so many of us are
absorbed by these unending cultural skirmishes
is that we feel powerless when confronting
intractable societal problems, overwhelming economic forces, and a political system that seems
utterly resistant to meaningful change. Any apparent victory for "our" side-changing a corporate
policy, getting an offensive speaker to apologize,
removing an opponent from a position of powercreates a sense of empowerment in contrast to the
despair that sets in when we contemplate systemic
evils beyond our control. And, worse, it perpetuates

the all-too-common illusion that our complex
world is amenable to simple corrections.
Certainly, we must recognize and confront
social injustices, demand change, and even urge
personal atonement, but we need to better manage
and focus our outrage, justifiable as it may be, and
rein in our passions to expose and humiliate, exact
revenge, and vindicate our positions. Progressives
can justify our claims to being fair and openminded by learning and exercising skills that help
us argue for what we hold most dear, rather than
brandishing the rhetoric and weapons of marginalization and disempowerment. Rather than
decomplexifying the world, we can argue for a
more dynamic view, even if that doesn't fully comport with our ideals. We should choose our battles
carefully and conduct them in ways commensurate
with the values we profess. This is a first crucial step
toward realizing the healed world we imagine and
for which we hope. 't

David Lott is a freelance book editor living in
Washington, D.C.

DEATH IN LATE OCTOBER REVISITED
The fawn didn't understand steel and glass at forty-five miles an hour even to the point of
impact. Even after glass and light shattered within its rib cage, and moths half disintegrated
smote into dust between the grill and the skull. No hunt here. No stalking. No ivory fangs or
frantic chase. There was only the road. One step. And darkness. The fawn lay on its ruined side
in the gutter, still walking. Hooves hooving at nothing. Where is my breath? How could the fawn
understand Roy Orbison crooning from the radio or the man shaking above her or the rock in his
white knuckled fist poised forever above her one good eye?

John Allen Taylor
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SABBATH GARDEN
After summer's gorge, that long humid shrug
of heat, a heft, and past, into her waning, even the first
frost would not undo its work, still the fingerling
zucchini's broad leaves browning and our tomatoes, green,
hanging in their cages, stems and leaves brittled black. A frost
will speak its truth, as over the night it rides some small
wind, crusting the tips of each thing in shadow. It does not
ruin, not yet. Some hardiness is ours: we can
-can't we? -grow there, know the rake, the hoe's
hand, like a grandfather's uncertain palms, big as moonpaws
through our hair. Until it snows, too early, the uncarved
pumpkins slicked with a slight shell of ice. Not Frost's

:

hoary glass from the water bucket, his apples
having done him in-it is sleep I think of, those three
raised beds, four red cabbage I planted late, my zeal
thick as any fool's-what to do with so much? Heavy
heads, their catchment leaves, fanning out
like a great purple grace, tilted to the sod, ready for rest.

Susanna Childress
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